A Schema for Duality, Illustrated by Bosonization by De Haro, Sebastian & Butterfield, Jeremy
A Schema for Duality, Illustrated by Bosonization
Sebastian De Haro and Jeremy Butterfield
Trinity College, Cambridge, CB2 1TQ, United Kingdom1
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge
Free School Lane, Cambridge CB2 3RH, United Kingdom
sd696@cam.ac.uk, jb56@cam.ac.uk
Friday 22 Dec 2017
Abstract
In this paper we present a schema for describing dualities between physical theories
(Sections 2 and 3), and illustrate it in detail with the example of bosonization: a boson-
fermion duality in two-dimensional quantum field theory (Sections 4 and 5).
The schema develops proposals in De Haro (2016, 2016a): these proposals include
construals of notions related to duality, like representation, model, symmetry and inter-
pretation. The aim of the schema is to give a more precise criterion for duality than has
so far been considered.
The bosonization example, or boson-fermion duality, has the feature of being simple yet
rich enough to illustrate the most relevant aspects of our schema, which also apply to more
sophisticated dualities. The richness of the example consists, mainly, in its concern with
two non-trivial quantum field theories: including massive Thirring-sine-Gordon duality,
and non-abelian bosonization.
This prompts two comparisons with the recent philosophical literature on dualities:—
(a) Unlike the standard cases of duality in quantum field theory and string theory,
where only specific simplifying limits of the theories are explicitly known, the boson-
fermion duality is known to hold exactly. This exactness can be exhibited explicitly.
(b) The bosonization example illustrates both the cases of isomorphic and non-isomorphic
models: which we believe the literature on dualities has not so far discussed.
1Published in Foundations of Mathematics and Physics One Century after Hilbert, New Perspectives,
edited by J. Kouneiher. Springer, 2018.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we present a schema for describing dualities between physical theories (Sec-
tions 2 and 3). Then we illustrate it in detail with the example of bosonization: a
boson-fermion duality in two-dimensional conformal field theories (Sections 4 and 5).
Before we introduce these two parts in turn (Sections 1.1, 1.2), we briefly set our
project in the context of the legacy of Hilbert’s work, a hundred and more years ago,
on the foundations of physics and its axiomatisation—work which it is an honour to
commemorate. This legacy is of course so broad and deep that we can only touch on it.
We will confine ourselves to recalling two Hilbertian ideas about the role of axiomatizing
a theory (either mathematical or physical): ideas which obviously relate to our project,
and which we will return to in Sections 2.4 and 5.4.
The background for both ideas, indeed for all Hilbert’s work in axiomatisation (such as
his axiomatisation in 1899 of Euclidean geometry, and his choosing as the sixth Problem
in his famous 1900 ‘To Do’ list, the axiomatisation of mechanics and geometry) was,
of course, the development of formal methods, in particular axiomatic studies, in all of
mathematics from about 1850.2
First, there is the idea that an axiom system can be realized, i.e. made true, by very
different models. (Recall Hilbert’s famous remark that ‘one must be able to say at all
times—instead of points, straight lines and planes—tables, chairs and beer-mugs’.) We
shall see that duality, in the sense nowadays used in physics, gives illustrations of this idea.
Indeed, very vivid illustrations. For duality, in physicists’ current jargon, involves there
being two theories that look very different (not just in their formulation and concepts,
but also apparently in the topics they are about) that are in some sense equivalent. In
particular, there is a ‘dictionary’ that pairs off the concepts in one theory with those
in the other. Thus in our example of bosonization, one theory will describe fermions,
while the other describes bosons: very different field-contents. So duality illustrates this
Hilbertian idea: but on a grand scale! For now, it is entire physical theories that are the
very different realizations of some common core axiom system. Indeed, as explained in
Section 1.1: we shall call the two sides, i.e. the items that are dual to each other, models
(viz. models of the single common core), rather than theories. So this usage echoes the
Hilbertian idea.3
2Again, we can only touch on the vast literature. For Hilbert’s Problems of 1900, cf. e.g. Gray (2000),
Grattan-Guinness (2000). For the sixth Problem, cf. Corry (1999, 2004, 2006, 2018), and Stachel (2018).
For some context for Hilbert’s famous ‘beer-mug’ remark, cf. Kennedy (1972). Finally, we note that Gray
(2008) makes an interesting case that this broad development represented a rise of ‘modernism’, in a
sense analogous to that in art and literature.
3The Hilbertian idea has, of course, other important facets: for example, in fostering the idea that an
axiom system—or more generally, a doctrine expressed in language—‘implicitly defines’ its terms. This
3
Second, Hilbert sees the activity of axiomatisation, not as giving a theory its final
form and so best undertaken when (one hopes!) it is fully understood, but as worthwhile
even when we recognize that the theory is far from its final form. For it is worthwhile
precisely in order to deepen our understanding of the theory. Again this idea has been
very influential. In physics, the best known example of its influence is no doubt von
Neumann’s monumental treatise on quantum mechanics (1932), which over the decades
has spawned so many axiomatic studies of quantum mechanics, most directly the quantum
logic approach. But also in philosophy, the idea was very influential. Reichenbach and
other logical empiricists saw axiomatisation as the way by which philosophers could clarify
scientific theories (and in particular, distinguish their factual and conventional contents—
a project that, for the logical empiricists, was the distinctive task of philosophy). Thus
we think of our own project—to formulate in general, almost formal, terms, the notion of
duality (Sections 2 and 3), and to illustrate this in bosonization (Sections 4 and 5)—as
an exercise in the tradition of this idea.4
In Section 1.1, we briefly introduce our notions of theory and model, and of duality as
an isomorphism between models. We motivate our usage and compare the notion of dual-
ity to the analogous notion of symmetry. In Section 1.2, we introduce our main example,
of bosonization, and compare this example to other examples used in the literature on
dualities.
1.1 The schema
The schema develops proposals in De Haro (2016, 2016a). Like other authors, we take
duality to be a suitable relation of equivalence between physical theories. The main fea-
tures of our schema are that:
1): we distinguish uninterpreted theories, which we call bare theories, from inter-
preted theories;
2): we emphasize that, wholly independently of issues of interpretation, a bare
theory can have many realizations, which we call models;
3): we take duality to be an isomorphism between two models of a single bare
theory.
Of these three features, it is 2) and 3) that are the distinctive ones. For several
authors also define duality in terms of uninterpreted theories. This has the advantage
of making verdicts of duality not beholden to semantic issues, and so less vague or even
controversial. And it allows cases of duality without any sort of physical or semantic
equivalence—which certainly occur, e.g. Kramers-Wannier duality between the high and
low temperature regimes of the statistical mechanics of a lattice. But features 2) and 3)
make duality an equivalence (formally: an isomorphism) between items that are not only
has been very influential in the foundations of logic and mathematics, beginning with Hilbert’s debate
with Frege. It has also of course been contested: in the face of non-categoricity, the claim to ‘define’
terms by a body of doctrine containing them is questionable.
4For some ‘post-Hilbert’ history of axiomatisation as ‘deepening the foundations’, cf. Sto¨ltzner (2000,
2001). But we should add that we do not endorse the logical empiricist project of distinguishing, once
and for all, the factual and conventional parts of a theory: our misgivings are essentially those of Putnam
(1962).
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uninterpreted, but also more specific than an uninterpreted theory: viz. realizations—
which we will call ‘models’—of a (single) bare theory. A prototypical example is: taking a
bare theory to be an abstract algebra of quantities (maybe also equipped with a dynamics,
viz. as a 1-parameter group of automorphisms, and a set of abstract states, i.e. rules for
evaluating (i.e. assinging values to) the quantities): a model or realization is given by a
representation (in the mathematical sense) of the algebra, together with a realization of
the rules for evaluating the quantities, for the representation in question, i.e. a set of maps
to the relevant field, of complex or real numbers.
We shall say ‘model’ rather than ‘realization’, not least for brevity. But we should
disavow, here at the outset, some misleading connotations of the word ‘model’. Indeed,
there are three misleading connotations. The word ‘model’, as contrasted with ‘theory’,
often connotes:
(i): a specific solution (at a single time: or for all times, i.e. a possible history)
for the physical system concerned, whereas the ‘theory’ encompasses all solutions—and
in many cases, for a whole class of systems;
(ii): an approximation, in particular an approximate solution, whereas the ‘theory’
deals with exact solutions;
(iii): being part of the physical world (in particular, being empirical, and-or ob-
servable) that gives the interpretation, whereas the ‘theory’ is of course not part of the
physical world, and so stands in need of interpretation.
So we stress that our use of ‘model’ rejects all three connotations. As we just said: for us,
a model is a specific realization—one might say ‘version’—of a theory. But it is a version
of a bare, i.e. uninterpreted, theory, and the version is itself bare, i.e. uninterpreted. So
a model adds details—we shall say: ‘specific structure’—to its bare theory. But these
details are not a matter of specifying: (i) a solution or history of the system; or (ii) ap-
proximation(s); or (iii) interpretation(s). Rather, the extra details are extra mathematical
structure: just like a representation of a group or an algebra has extra details or structure,
beyond that of the group or algebra of which it is a representation.5
Indeed, for clarity later on, we should distinguish two broad kinds of extra detail
or structure that a model adds. Again, group representations provide obvious—and
countless—examples.
(A): The ‘concreteness’ of a specific mathematical object: such as GL(n, |C), the
general linear group over |Cn, or any subgroup of it—any of which is a ‘concrete’, not
abstract, group. (Agreed, the concrete vs. abstract contrast is flexible; but this will not
matter for anything that follows.)
5We agreed that for our notion, the word ‘model’ has disadvantages. But note that other words
also have disadvantages. For example: ‘formulation’ connotes that any two formulations of a theory
are ‘notational variants’, i.e. fully equivalent: they say exactly the same thing about the world. But
that is far from true for our notion (and this matches the connotations of ‘model’): for us, two models
of a bare theory are in general not isomorphic, and not in any sense equivalent; and so typically, it is
surprising to find two isomorphic models, i.e. to find a duality. Other examples: ‘realization’, ‘instance’
and ‘instantiation’ connote being part of the physical world, as in ‘the mechanism/hardware which realizes
some specific function/software’, or ‘the object is an instance/instantiation of the predicate’—which is
the misleading connotation (iii) above.
Notice that in theoretical physics, the use of model is, roughly, between: (a) our use, and (b) (ii) and
(iii) above: e.g. the ‘massive Thirring model’ or the ‘sine-Gordon model’.
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(B): The fact that the mathematical notion of representation requires homomor-
phism, not isomorphism: i.e. it allows non-injectivity and non-surjectivity. Thus two
representations of an abstract group G can be non-isomorphic as groups—i.e. different,
even as described in only abstract group-theoretic terms—to G; and of course also, non-
isomorphic to each other.
Of course, these kinds (A) and (B) of ‘extra detail’ usually occur together: just think
of how every abstract group can be represented by the trivial one element subgroup of
GL(n, |C), the n× n identity matrix.
Our picture is therefore of a bare theory, that can be realized (we will say: modelled)
in various ways: like the different representations of an abstract group or algebra. And
these models are in general not isomorphic, since they differ from one another in their
specific structure: like inequivalent representations of a group. But we say: when the
models are isomorphic, we have a duality.
In Sections 2 and 3, we will develop this view of duality (with Section 2 dealing with
theories, models and interpretations, and Section 3 with symmetries). We end this Sub-
section with two further remarks about our schema. The first motivates our usage of
‘theory’ and ‘model’; the second compares duality with that more familiar topic, symme-
try.
(1): Motivating our usage:— Dualities in physics give a rationale for our usage of
‘theory’ and ‘model’, as introduced above. (This rationale does not depend on the contrast
between interpreted and uninterpreted (bare) theories; and so we temporarily set that
aside.) Recall that in both physics and philosophy of physics, ‘theory’ is usually taken as
something like a set of differential equations, and ‘model’ is usually taken as something
like a solution to such a set. But a duality often shows us that what we first considered
as distinct theories can, or should, be seen as the same theory, in two guises. Agreed,
that is very rough speaking: which will of course be clarified in what follows. But for
now, we only need the point that this kind of surprising discovery prompts us to move our
usage of ‘theory’ “one level up”. After all: if two sets of differential equations somehow
express the same theory, then a theory cannot be identified with such a set. Besides: if
we thus move our usage of ‘theory’ one level up, we can still keep the usual intuitive idea
of how ‘theory’ and ‘model’ are related—viz. that a model is a realization, or instance, of
a theory—by correspondingly moving our usage of ‘model’ one level up. And this is what
we have proposed.
To sum up: the broad and widely-agreed idea, that in physics a duality often suggests
that the two theories concerned, though they look different, are in fact ‘the same’, moti-
vates our proposed usage of ‘theory’ and ‘model’.
(2): Analogy with symmetry:— The analogy is (as is often remarked) that ‘a duality
is like a symmetry, but at the level of a theory’. Here, and for the rest of this Subsection,
we will temporarily set aside our jargon just announced, of ‘theory’ vs. ‘model’. We will
temporarily join the literature’s usual jargon of taking a theory to be interpreted, and a
model to be—not a ‘version’ of the theory with some specific structure of its own—but a
solution (or representative of a solution) of the theory.
That is, the analogy is: while a symmetry carries a state to another state that is ‘the
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same’ or ‘matches it’, a duality carries a theory to another theory that is ‘the same’ or
‘matches it’. We will endorse this analogy. So the interesting questions, for both sides
of the analogy, will concern the different ways to make precise ‘the same’ or ‘matches’.
We give details (respecting our proposed ‘theory’ vs. ‘model’ usage!) in Sections 3.1 and
3.2. But the questions about making precise ‘the same’/‘matches’ can be introduced as
follows.
A symmetry a (we write a for ‘automorphism’) carries a state s in a state space S to
another state a(s): thanks to a being a symmetry, the two states s and a(s) assign the
same values to all the quantities (i.e. magnitudes) in some salient, usually large, set of
quantities. The question then arises: do s and a(s) represent the very same physical state
of affairs, or scenario—or in philosophers’ jargon: the same possible world?
The answer, in full generality, is of course: ‘No’. That is: not always. But for a
large enough set of quantities being preserved; and in particular for a theory that is a
‘toy cosmology’ (i.e. a theory whose system of interest is a cosmos, with no external
environment, so that there are no relational quantities whose values are not preserved by
a): there is a tradition of answering ‘Yes’.
Debate then ensues about:
(i) what are the general conditions for the ‘Yes’ answer being correct? and
(ii) what does the ‘Yes’ answer imply about the propriety of—perhaps even the
requirement of—moving to a reduced formalism, i.e. one in which states are taken as the
orbits, in the given formalism, of the action of the symmetry a?6
So, turning to our topic of dualities: we endorse the analogy. We will say, roughly
speaking, that: a theory T is mapped by duality d to a theory d(T ) which is ‘the same’
as T . This will be made precise in various ways. But it is worth stressing now, in line
with the three features 1), 2) and 3) we listed at the start of this Subsection, that:
(a): We take theories to be initially uninterpreted: so it will not follow from the
existence of a duality map d that T and d(T ) are wholly equivalent (‘state the very same
propositions’).
(b): We make explicit the interpretation of a theory’s formalism: so there will be
interpretation maps I acting on both the theory T and its dual d(T ).
(c): For a given theory, we distinguish different realizations of it, which we call
‘models’. Duality is an isomorphism between such models: an isomorphism that is often
surprising since the models, despite their common core, “look different”.
1.2 Bosonization and other dualities
In this Subsection, we motivate our choice of bosonization as the illustration of our schema.
We first sketch a spectrum of examples of dualities (Section 1.2.1). Then we describe how
bosonization strikes a balance between mathematical rigour and physical interest, and
introduce its main features (Section 1.2.2).
6A bit more precisely: states would be taken as the union of the orbits for all the symmetries for which
the ‘Yes’ answer is true. For recent work on the debate about (i) and (ii), cf. Caulton (2015), Dewar
(2016) and Weatherall (2015).
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1.2.1 Examples of dualities
Recent philosophical literature on duality and theoretical equivalence has dealt with three
main kinds of examples:—
(a): equivalence between models (in our sense!) formulated in first-order (maybe
many-sorted) logic: e.g. definitional equivalence, Morita equivalence, and-or categorical
equivalence (e.g. Barrett and Halvorson (2016, 2016a));
(b): categorical equivalence of models (in our sense) of classical theories (e.g. Weather-
all (2015), Teh (2016));
(c): dualities between models (in our sense) of quantum theories whose classical de-
scriptions are very different (e.g. Dieks et al. (2015), De Haro (2017), De Haro et al. (2017),
Fraser (2017), Huggett (2017), Rickles (2017), Matsubara (2013)).
The classification (a)-(c) is arranged in increasing order of physical (not mathematical!)
sophistication. Consequently, there is also decreasing mathematical rigour, as one moves
from kind (a) to kind (c):
Kind (a): These examples have the advantage of being very simple, in their reliance
on first-order logic only: and so, the notions of equivalence in question can be defined
rigorously. But in their simplicity, the notions developed, and the examples given, gener-
ally do not seem to have sufficient structure that they could describe in detail the sorts
of examples that physicists would be interested in. (At any rate, the authors cited do
not describe how such logical models can illustrate even the simplest physical models of,
say, classical, source-free Maxwell theory: which is, of course, not to claim that this is
impossible!).
Kind (b): These examples include some important models of classical theories, such as
Newtonian gravitation, general relativity, and Yang-Mills theory models. But these ex-
amples also have some limitations. (1): To physicists, the example is, typically, not
surprising (e.g. Newtonian gravitation being equivalent to geometrized Newtonian grav-
itation). (2): When it is surprising (e.g. Teh (2016)), it is not a case of equivalence,
but rather of analogy. Furthermore, (3): categorical equivalence has been criticised by
Barrett and Halvorson (2016a) for being ‘too liberal’. In our view, the element of ‘sur-
prise’ (see Section 2.1) seems to come with models of quantum theories, i.e. examples of (c):
Kind (c): Typical examples of this kind are dualities between very different-looking models
of quantum field theories, or of string theories (cf. Witten (2018)).
This explains the recent interest, shown by both physicists and philosophers of physics,
in such dualities. Physicists tend to view dualities as powerful epistemic statements:
the epistemic gain being both mathematical and physical. As the mathematical aspect:
mirror symmetry is the prime example.7 Michael Atiyah has characterised the discovery
of mirror symmetry as ‘spectacular’: since it established a new link between complex
geometry and symplectic geometry, later proven (in one of its simplified versions) by
7Despite the name of ‘symmetry’, mirror symmetry falls under what we here call a duality. That mirror
symmetry is a case of duality—of two different models, rather than a single model, being related—is
uncontroversial, and reflected in the literature.
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mathematicians (2009, p. 83). As to the physical aspect: gauge-gravity duality is an
important example, which has led to both new theoretical developments in quantum
gravity, and to new experimental results and ideas (like the explanation of the shear
viscosity-to-entropy ratio in a quark-gluon plasma, and recent applications to cosmology:
cf. e.g. Ammon and Erdmenger (2015), De Haro et al. (2016)). Other examples are
T-duality (related to mirror symmetry) and S-duality: which falls under the same class
of dualities as our bosonization example, viz. exchanging Noether charges and topological
charges (Castellani (2017)). An important idea of these dualities is that it is the models of
the quantum theories which are equivalent, while their classical limits are very disparate
(differing in the number or the size of the dimensions, the matter content, etc.). These
two aspects—physical and mathematical—will be developed in Section 2.1’s discussion of
the scientific importance of dualities.
But there is a second reason these dualities interest philosophers of physics: which the
recent literature has emphasised. Namely, these dualities obviously bear on philosophical
questions such as the distinction between theoretical and physical equivalence, emergence
(of spacetime, and-or other entities), and realism vs. structuralism. We will return to
these questions in another paper.
Agreed: examples of kind (c) also have limitations, as follows. (1): The models (in our
sense) are mathematically very difficult; and typically, no exact formulation of the models
that are dual is yet known. So the duality, e.g. in the case of gauge-gravity duality, is
still—despite all the favourable evidence, in various limits etc.—a conjecture. (2): The
physics involved is not yet established, since the models involved either deal with quantum
gravity situations (a regime of energies about which experiment has so far given no direct
clues: cf. Smolin (2018)), or involve simplifying assumptions about the world, typically a
high degree of symmetry (e.g. supersymmetric quantum field theory models).
1.2.2 Bosonization introduced
It is clear, in the light of Section 1.2.1, that to illustrate our schema, we should choose
an example that judiciously balances the desiderata: on the one hand, (i): mathematical
precision and established physics, as in kinds (a) and (b); on the other, (ii): scientific
importance, as in kind (c). As we will see in detail in Sections 4 and 5: bosonization or,
more precisely, boson-fermion duality in two dimensions, is just such an example.
As to (i): Boson-fermion duality allows a treatment of the quantum theory model
that does not need to rely on techniques of approximation such as perturbation theory.
For this reason, boson-fermion duality explicitly illustrates our schema: the common core
theory can be formulated according to our construal in Section 2.2.1, and the two sides
of the duality are models in the sense of Section 2.2.2. The physics of these models is not
speculative, and these 1+1-dimensional models describe systems that can be realised in
the lab, e.g. as one-dimensional spin chains (Giamarchi (2003: Chapter 2), Altland and
Simons (2010: Sections 4.3 and 9.4.4)).
As to (ii): The scientific importance of the duality is witnessed by three facts. (1):
Bosonization involves rich models of quantum field theories, and not just classical theories;
(2) it is an active area of physics (see e.g. Gogolin et al. (2004), Kopietz (2008)); and (3)
it illustrates the surprise that we discuss in Section 2.1, viz. by relating a model of bosons
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and a model of fermions.
Bosonization was discovered in two papers by Coleman (1975) and Mandelstam (1975),
which built on previous work on the sine-Gordon and Thirring models (Dell’Antonio et
al. (1972)). Coleman discovered that the sine-Gordon model (a scalar field whose in-
teraction potential is the cosine of the field) in 1+1 dimensions was equivalent to the
charge-zero sector of the massive Thirring model (a massive Dirac fermion field with
quartic interaction) in 1+1 dimensions.8 ‘Charge-zero sector’ here refers to the restriction
of the physical quantities of the model to pairs of fermionic fields. Thus Coleman wrote:
‘... under the assumption that one can only make particle-antiparticle pairs out of
the vacuum, not single particles ... For massless particles in two dimensions, it is quite
possible to make a pair that never separates. Such a pair consists of two particles moving
in the same direction. The wave functions do not spread; they just move on steadily at
the speed of light, and the particles never get away from each other [since there is no
other direction in which they could turn]. If the particles had a mass, or if the world were
of greater than two dimensions, this would not be possible.’ (p. 2094).
While Coleman’s analysis was perturbative, Mandelstam constructed a map which was
exact, and went both ways. Not only could a boson be mapped to a pair of fermions; but
also the map could be inverted, so as to map a single fermion to a coherent state of bosons.
The construction was non-perturbative, i.e. it did not use perturbation theory. This is re-
lated to the fact, already recognised by Coleman (1975: p. 2088), that all divergences that
occur in perturbation theory can be removed by normal-ordering the Hamiltonian. Man-
delstam also did a canonical treatment of the model, working out canonical commutation
relations between the fields and the currents constructed from them, using regularisation
and renormalisation. Therefore, boson-fermion duality was proven to be exact.
There are three significant features of this duality: features that both (a) justify our
claim, two paragraphs above, that boson-fermion duality balances the desiderata (i) and
(ii), and (b) bear out the conceptual relevance of the example.
(A): The duality is exact. That is: it is valid for all physically interesting values of
the parameters, and it does not require the use of perturbation theory. In this respect,
boson-fermion duality is closer to kinds (a) and (b) than kind (c). Yet the models related
as duals are non-trivial (because massive, or massless, and interacting!: see Section 5.5)
quantum field theory models—and in that sense they are in kind (c)!
(B) The duality goes both ways. It relates boson operators to fermion operators, and
vice versa. This is, of course, surprising, since these two kinds of operators have very
different properties: both mathematically (e.g. different statistics) and physically (they
describe particles with distinct properties). We will explain, in Section 4, how two models
with such disparate formulations can nevertheless be isomorphic to each other.
(C) The duality maps the weak-coupling regime of one model to the strong-coupling
8See Section 5.5.1; for the simple, free case, see Section 4. Here of course we adopt the usual theoretical
physics usage of ‘model’: cf. the end of footnote 5.
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Here, β is the coupling constant of the bosonic model (the sine-Gordon model) and g is
the coupling constant of the fermionic model (the Thirring model: for more details, see
Section 5.5.1). Clearly, when β → 0, g → ∞. This attests to the physical richness and,
indeed, the non-trivial character of the duality. This weak coupling/strong coupling corre-
spondence has later been found to be a feature of most dualities of kind (c), i.e. dualities in
models of quantum field theory and string theory: especially S-duality and gauge-gravity
duality.9 This richness is the main reason why physicists are interested in dualities: since
they can learn about the strong-coupling regime of one model (where perturbation theory
cannot be used effectively nor reliably, so that the model is in general much harder to
deal with) from the weak-coupling regime of the other model (where perturbation theory
is usually a good guide). For more discussion of how Eq. (1) contributes to scientific
importance, see Section 2.1-(2).
Features (A) and (B) are needed in order that the example illustrate our schema with
mathematical precision. We will spell this out in Section 5. Indeed, we believe this is
the first conceptual and technical exposition in the philosophical literature of a duality
combining the physical interest of kind (c), with features (A)-(B).
Feature (C) relates to another important topic relating to dualities, viz. that of emer-
gence. Indeed, a recent theme in the philosophy of physics literature has been the close
connection between duality and emergence.10 A framework for understanding the connec-
tion between dualities and emergence was developed in De Haro (2016): it was argued that
the two notions (duality as isomorphism, and emergence as novel and robust behaviour
relative to a comparison class), while close to each other, also exclude one another. But
we must leave the topic of emergence for another occasion.
Feature (B) also prompts the question of fundamentality. Coleman himself wrote:
‘I am led to conjecture a form of duality, or nuclear democracy in the sense of Chew,
for this two-dimensional theory. A single theory has two equally valid descriptions in
terms of Lagrangian field theory: the massive Thirring model and the quantum sine-
Gordon equation. The particles which are fundamental in one description are composite
in the other: In the Thirring model, the fermion is fundamental and the boson a fermion-
antifermion bound state; in the sine-Gordon equation, the boson is fundamental and the
fermion a coherent bound state’ (1975: p. 2096).
The issue of fundamentality in boson-fermion duality, and in electric-magnetic dual-
ity, has been addressed by Castellani (2017). Her account is, in philosophers’ jargon,
deflationary. That is: she argues that all the manifestations of the fields (as bosonic or
as fermionic; as electric or magnetic) are ontologically equally fundamental: ‘What the
duality specifically implies here, concerns, not mutual composition of the particles, but
9In T-duality and mirror symmetry, it is not the size of the couplings that is inverted by the duality
map but, roughly speaking, the sizes of the spaces.
10On the connection between duality and emergence, see: Dieks et al. (2015), Rickles (2013), Teh
(2013).
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rather their different modes of appearance when considering the different classical limits
of the quantum theory, i.e. the dual perspectives’ (2017: Section 3.3).
Our construal of duality as an isomorphism, in Sections 2 and 3, is in agreement with
such a deflationary account. For the content of the theory will be taken to be based on
the common core of the models: and this common core includes both bosons and fermions,
on an equal footing. We will discuss some of these issues in Section 3.2.3, but we will not
emphasise this point: (for it was worked out in detail for a general duality, and illustrated
for gauge-gravity duality, in De Haro (2016a: Section 1), under the heading of ‘physical
equivalence’).
2 The Schema Introduced: Theories and Models
In this Section and the next, we develop the treatments of theory, model, interpretation,
symmetry and duality, given in De Haro (2016: Section 1, 2016a: Section 1) (and foreshad-
owed in De Haro, Teh, and Butterfield (2016)). This Section deals with theory, model
and interpretation; Section 3 will deal with symmetry and duality itself.
We begin with the scientific importance of dualities, and the comparison of duality with
gauge (Section 2.1). Then we further specify our notions of theory and model (Section
2.2). Then we discuss: interpretations (Section 2.3), representations and isomorphisms
(Section 2.4).
2.1 Duality’s scientific importance
Recall from Section 1, our overall proposal. A bare theory can be realized (we will say:
modelled) in various ways, like the different representations of an abstract algebra. These
models are in general not isomorphic, since they differ from one another in their specific
structure. But when they are isomorphic, we have a duality.
To develop this proposal, we begin with four clarifying remarks. Each remark leads
in to the next. The first three defend our taking duality as a notion that is both logically
weak and independent of a theory’s interpretation. The first is, in effect, just the point
that ‘duality’ is a term of art; so one can choose how to use it: and our choice of a log-
ically weak definition makes for a strong physical notion! But the second and third are
substantive—about the scientific importance of dualities. The fourth remark is a contrast
with the notion of gauge.
(1): A logically weak but physically strong definition:— We agree that at first sight,
it looks profligate to say that there is duality whenever two models are isomorphic. For
it means there are countless dualities. For example: if a group or an algebra, endowed
with a set of rules for evaluating quantities, can be a bare theory, any two isomorphic
representations will yield a duality, as long as the isomorphism preserves the values of
the quantities. Accordingly, the notion of duality is sometimes narrowed by adding phys-
ical conditions, not just on ‘bare theory’, but also on the isomorphism between models,
e.g. by requiring the isomorphism to link the weak and strong coupling regimes of the two
models (see Eq. (1)). But we will maintain in (2) and (3) below that it is best to leave
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‘duality’ broadly defined, as we have done: with such extra conditions being articulated
in individual cases as the need arises. As we will see in Section 3.2.2, the strengthening
will be given by the kind of physical degrees of freedom that one wishes to describe. And
so, our notion of duality will be physically strong. In particular, it cannot be argued that
two given models which share some structure are dual, unless the common structure is
exactly equal to what the models regard as physical. In short: this apparently profligate
verdict can be accepted.
(2): Duality as surprising:— So far we have spoken mainly of logico-semantic issues,
and ignored epistemological ones: we have said what a duality is, but not how surprising
and fruitful it can be. Our case-study, in Sections 4 et seq., will of course bring out
these issues. It is surprising indeed to learn that a theory we thought of as having as
its quantum particles fermions also contains bosons—and even more surprising to learn
that conversely the theory can be presented in the first place as having bosons, and then
shown to contain the fermions with which we first began. For the moment, we note three
clarifying comments—which are suggested by phrases like ‘a theory we thought of’, and
‘the theory can be presented’. Each comment leads in to the next.
(i): We usually discover a duality in the context, not of a bare theory, but of an
interpreted theory; for of course we work with interpreted theories.11
(ii): Indeed, we usually work with what we have called ‘a model of the theory’,
indeed an interpreted model. That is: usually, before the duality is discovered, we have
two interpreted models (usually called ‘physical theories’ !) which we do not believe to be
isomorphic in any relevant sense.
(iii): Usually, we do not initially believe the two models are models of any single
relevant theory (even of a bare one: i.e. even if we let ourselves completely suspend our
antecedent interpretation of the models). The surprise is to discover that they are such
models—indeed are isomorphic ones.
The word ‘relevant’ in (ii) and (iii) signals the fact that of course ‘isomorphism’,
‘model’ and ‘theory’ are very flexible words. For example: almost any two items can be
considered isomorphic, i.e. as having a common structure, under a weak enough construal
of ‘structure’. Thus physicists might well in some specific context notice that the two
models in question are both groups, or both algebras. But they rightly do not announce
this as discovering a duality: not even if they also notice that the two groups (or algebras)
are isomorphic. They set it aside as irrelevant, since the abstract notion of group or of
algebra is so general that having it identified as a bare theory in common between the
models is scientifically useless.
On the contrary, what is surprising, and scientifically valuable, is to find very specific,
not general, structures in common between different models: especially when
(a) the models as presented (so: as interpreted) are very disparate, and-or
11Agreed, pure mathematicians sometimes work with uninterpreted theories; and duality is a grand
theme in mathematics, just as it is in physics. But although comparing duality in mathematics and in
physics would be a very worthwhile project, we set it aside. Cf. Corfield (2017).
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(b) the common structure is not only detailed (like ‘10-dimensional semisimple Lie
group’, as against ‘group’) but amounts to an isomorphism of that detailed structure (like
‘isomorphic as 10-dimensional semisimple Lie groups’).
As noted above, what will give physical theories their specificity, thus making duality a
more powerful tool than its logically weak definition might make it seem, is the fact that
physical theories, even bare ones, come with sets of maps from groups and algebras to
appropriate fields (in the mathematical, not physical, sense!), i.e. maps that assign values
to the physical quantities. These maps are defined at the level of the abstract structure,
but must also be instantiated in each of the models (according to the relevant sense of
instantiation, as either ‘representation’ or ‘realization’: cf. Section 2.2.2). And this set
of maps is usually so rich, that it often suffices to reconstruct a model. And so, the fact
that duality preserves these maps can be very non-trivial, and surprising, especially when
combined with (a)-(b) above.
This discussion of (a)-(b) returns us to (1) above. We doubt that there can be a
general characterization of when the models as presented are disparate enough, and-or
the discovered isomorphism is detailed enough, for scientific importance. Instead, one
can only articulate in any specific case how the disparity and-or the details are enough:
e.g. because the isomorphism links the weak and strong coupling regimes of the two mod-
els. So it is not worth trying to tighten the definition of ‘duality’ with conditions beyond
the logically weak ones we advocate. One just needs to use one’s judgment about which
cases count as scientifically important enough to analyse.
(3): Examples:— The conclusion of (2) is supported by some famous examples of dual-
ity in physics. Apart from boson-fermion duality, which we already introduced in Section
1.2, it is worth illustrating this with two other examples.
(A): Gauge-gravity duality. In this case, the models differ in the dimensions they
assign to spacetime (d in the gravity model, d−1 in the gauge model), in their field content
and classical equations of motion (Einstein’s equations coupled to matter in the gravity
model, the Yang-Mills equations in the gauge model), and in much more. In this case,
the common core consists only in a class of asymptotic operators and a conformal class of
(d− 1)-dimensional metrics. Of course, it is very surprising to learn that a gauge theory
model in d−1 dimensions, and a model of quantum gravity in d dimensions, despite their
very disparate guises, nevertheless have the same common core, and represent the same
theory. See De Haro (2016, 2016a) for a discussion in the context of our schema.
(B): Electric-magnetic, or S-duality. This relates two models by mapping the elec-
tric charges of one model to the magnetic charges of the other. Furthermore, it does so by
mapping a small electric charge to a large magnetic charge, analogously to (1) (since the
charges play the role of couplings, in gauge models). Nevertheless, the common structure
is the same in the two models, i.e. the quantum theory is invariant under the replacement
of one gauge group by its dual.
(4): A contrast with ‘gauge’:— This discussion of dualities’ scientific importance brings
out a contrast between our treatment of duality, and the notion of gauge. Physicists
sometimes make remarks like: ‘two dual theories are like different gauge formulations of a
single theory’. We agree that this remark is analogous to our view: indeed, in two ways.
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(i): A gauge formulation of a theory has specific structure (viz. the gauge variables)
going beyond that mandated by the ideas (gauge-invariant ideas!) of the theory; just like
for us, a model has specific structure going beyond that mandated by the bare theory.
(ii): The idea of gauge as ‘descriptive redundancy’ means that two gauge formulations
of a single theory must ‘say the same thing’; just like we say that in a duality, two models
are isomorphic, and so (if interpreted: could) ‘say the same thing’.
But we submit that this is only an analogy. There are two differences. First, we want to
allow for cases where the two duals are not physically equivalent (as in Kramers-Wannier
duality, mentioned above): pace the suggestion in (ii). Second (and more importantly),
the extra structure in a model is usually not gauge, i.e. descriptively redundant: think of
how the extra structure in a representation of a group usually carries physical information
(e.g. a representation of the Poincare group carrying mass and spin information). Again,
as stressed in (2) above: the surprising and scientifically important discovery is that in two
models, with apparently very disparate structures, there is in fact an exact correspondence
of structures. We shall return to these two differences in Section 3.2.4, comment (3).
2.2 Theories and Models
In this subsection, we add details about the ideas of a bare theory and its models, already
introduced in Section 1.
2.2.1 Bare theories
Following De Haro (2016, 2016a), we take a bare theory to be a triple T := 〈S,Q,D〉
comprising a structured set of states, a structured set of quantities, and a dynamics:
together of course with the rules for evaluating the physical quantities on the states. (We
will later discuss symmetries, which we will take as automorphisms a : S → S of the set
of states; or as the dual maps on the set Q of quantities.)
Two immediate points of clarification:—
(1): We stress that, despite the physical connotations of the words ‘states’, ‘quan-
tities’, and ‘dynamics’, a bare theory is not interpreted physically. Interpretation comes
later (cf. Section 2.3). Thus it will help to think of a bare theory as given by an en-
tirely abstract algebra of quantities, together with a similarly abstract state-space and
dynamics. For example, the quantities might be (the self-adjoint elements of) an abstract
C*-algebra A, the state-space might be determined by A, viz. as the positive linear func-
tionals on A, and the dynamics might be an arbitrary automorphism of A.
(2): Indeed, it will help to think of a bare theory yet more generally. The reason is
that most of what we need to say throughout Section 2, about theories and accordingly
about their models, is independent of taking a bare theory as a triple—even an uninter-
preted one a la (1). It depends only on a bare theory having two features:
(a) being uninterpreted, yet ready to be interpreted as a physical theory (hence
the idea of the abstract set of states, quantities etc. ‘standing ready’ for interpretation);
(b) being augmentable, i.e. able to be supplemented with extra (again: unin-
terpreted) structure, in various ways, yielding different realizations, which we will call
‘models’: (to which we will turn directly, in Section 2.2.2).
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Clearly, a theory does not need to be a triple 〈S,Q,D〉 in order to have features (a) and
(b). It could, for example, be a theory in logicians’ traditional sense of a deductively
closed set of formulas in a formal language: such a theory is uninterpreted, and can be
augmented in many ways, for example just by adding an extra set of formulas and then
closing under deduction. (Here we again connect with the Hilbertian and logical empiri-
cist tradition of formulating physical theories axiomatically, mentioned at the start of
Section 1. But we must postpone discussion till Section 2.4.)
2.2.2 Models
So we define a model M of a bare theory T to be a realization of T . The word ‘realization’
can be taken in two senses:—
(i): In the broad sense of a mathematical instantiation: i.e. a mathematical entity
having the structure of the theory, and usually of course some specific structure of its own
(cf. (2)(b) in Section 2.2.1). Thus if T is a theory in the logicians’ sense of a deductively
closed set of formulas, a realization is an entity that in some sense ‘satisfies’ all the
formulas of T , and usually of course some formulas of its own. So any deductively closed
superset of T would count as a realization of T ; but so of course would any model of T
in logicians’ usual sense of ‘model’.
(ii): In the mathematical sense of ‘representation’, as in representation theory.
This requires T to have some structure, so that a representation is a homomorphism (of
that structure) from T to some given, structured object. Since homomorphism need not
be isomorphism, the homomorphism’s range—the structured object that represents—may
have only a ‘coarse-grained’ version of T ’s structure. But like in (i): since the representing
object is ‘given’, it will also have specific structure of its own. (Recall the two kinds, (A)
and (B), of ‘extra detail’ in Section 1.1.) Again, the obvious examples are when T is an
abstract group or algebra, endowed with a set of rules for evaluating quantities, and a
model is a group/algebra representation: for example a subgroup of the general linear
group on a complex vector space, GL(n, |C), endowed with a set of maps to the complex
numbers, invariant under similarity transformations, e.g. the group characters.
In our specific example of duality, bosonization (Section 4 et seq.), we will use the
second more specific notion, i.e. representation, (ii). But again: much of what we say in
this Section needs only (i): the first, more general, sense of realization. And we believe
that this notion applies more generally, to the dualities in quantum field theory and
string theory: gauge-gravity duality (De Haro (2016a)), mirror symmetry, T-duality, and
S-duality; cf. Sections 2.4 and 5.4.
2.2.3 Notations for models; model roots and model triples
It is helpful to have a schematic notation for models that exhibits how they augment the
structure of a theory with specific structure of their own. This will also introduce some
jargon which will be important for us.
One’s first thought is to write the model as the ordered pair of the theory and its
specific structure, M¯ say: M = 〈T, M¯〉. But we need to reflect the fact that (in almost all
cases) the way that a model incorporates the theory’s structure is not by simply containing
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a ‘copy’ of the theory ‘beside’ its specific structure M¯ : but instead, by using M¯ to build
a realization—in one or other of Section 2.2.2’s two senses—of the theory’s structure.
Again, the obvious example of group representations illustrates. We should not think of a
matrix representation of, say, the symmetric group SN as containing a copy of SN ‘beside’
its specific structure of a vector space V and N ! linear maps on V ; (or maybe less than
N ! maps—recall that a representation need only be a homomorphism). Rather, V and
the (upto!) N ! linear maps realize, give a ‘concrete copy’ of, SN .
Similarly for examples of dualities in physics, including our example of bosonization.
In a typical physics example, the specific structure M¯ consists of a set of fields, endowed
with a set of symmetries, a dynamics for the fields, and a set of states of the fields. (So
here, fields play the role of quantities in our conception of theories as triples, though of
course not all fields are observable: in quantum theories, self-adjoint.) These fields etc.
are used to build a ‘concrete copy’ of the bare theory’s structure (or maybe a ‘coarse-
grained’ copy). In our own example: a concrete copy of the enveloping affine Lie algebra
or Kac-Moody algebra (see Eq. (41) in the Appendix), which is the algebra of which both
the bosons and the fermions are representations.
So a better notation that reflects how M¯ is used to build a realization of T is to write:
M = 〈TM , M¯〉. The occurrence of T in the notation encodes that the model M is indeed
a model of T . But the subscript M on T reflects that the specific structure M¯ is used to
realize T . In short, TM is not ‘given before’ M itself: rather, TM realizes T—in one or
other of Section 2.2.2’s two senses—by making use of M¯ .
So one should not think of the model as an ordered pair made from two already-given
items TM and M¯ . Rather, the decomposition M = 〈TM , M¯〉 is conceptual.12
It will be convenient to have a word for TM , the ‘part’ of M that realizes T . We call
it the model root. It will also be convenient to have a notation for the model root that
does not mention T , just for simplicity in discussions where it is obvious that one theory
T is in question. We use m. Thus a theory T can have various models and model roots,
Mi and mi, where i is in some index set I. This notation m, i.e. without mention of T ,
will be useful in Section 2.4.
This discussion carries over intact to the more detailed conception of a theory as a
triple, T = 〈S,Q,D〉. We write a model, not as a pair, but as a quadruple:
M = 〈SM ,QM ,DM , M¯〉 =: 〈m, M¯〉 , (2)
where m := TM := 〈SM ,QM ,DM〉 will be dubbed the model triple, as well as model
root. As before, M¯ is the specific structure that distinguishes one model, and so model
root/triple, from another; and it is M¯ that is used to build the model triple.
This jargon of model root, and model triple, will be important in relation to our
proposed schema for duality, that a duality is an isomorphism of models. For this iso-
morphism is of course isomorphism as regards the bare theory’s structure, rather than
any other structure: in particular, this isomorphism sets aside the specific structure (even
12Besides, in physics examples the actual mathematical structure of a model is often very rich, e.g. in
gauge-gravity dualities the metric of a (d+ 1)-dimensional spacetime will belong to the specific structure
M¯ , but this metric will be a fibration over the metric of a d-dimensional spacetime, which belongs to TM :
see De Haro (2016: Section 2.1, 2016a: Section 2.2).
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though the model’s realizing the bare theory is built from its specific structure). Accord-
ingly, we will often talk of duality as an isomorphism of model roots; and also, when a
theory is conceived as a triple, as an isomorphism of model triples.
Finally, it will also be convenient (especially in Section 3.1) to have notation for a
model considered in itself, not by comparison with the bare theory of which it is a model.
A model is of course itself also a triple of a set of states, quantities and a dynamics: i.e. its
own states etc., not that of the bare theory. And we will again use the overbar to indicate
what is specific to the model. So we write: M = 〈S¯, Q¯, D¯〉.
This prompts the question: what is the relation between the unbarred items S,Q,D
that make up a bare theory T , and the barred items S¯, Q¯, D¯? We will not attempt a
general answer to this: we will not need one, and indeed we doubt that there is one. But
bearing in mind the prototypical cases of representations of groups or algebras (e.g. rep-
resentations of the Poincare or conformal algebras which add a specific field content),
the tempting, broad answer is that the barred items “are bigger”/“have more structure”.
(This is another aspect of the analogy between duality and gauge, despite the contrasts
we stressed in remark (4) at the end of Section 2.1: both for two dual models and for
a gauge formulation of a theory, there is the intuition of “being bigger”/“having more
structure”.)
In the example of boson-fermion duality, as we will see in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, the
theory consists of a specific enveloping algebra of the affine algebra (see Eq. (41) in
the Appendix), together with a representation space for this algebra and appropriate
functionals to the real numbers, which represent the quantities that (in the interpreted
theory) become the physical quantities. But the models contain a complex variable z,
which represents two-dimensional spacetime. Using this variable, one can construct, from
the operators of the algebra, the bosonic (Klein-Gordon) or fermionic (Dirac fermion) field
of the bosonic and the fermionic model, respectively. We shall argue in Section 5.4:(c)
that, at the level of the bare theory, the specific dependence of the fields on the spacetime
variable z has no particular significance, and is not needed: so that this suggests the
formulation of a more general theory, with less structure.
2.3 Interpretations of theories and models
So far, so abstract! Both theories and models have so far been bare, i.e. uninterpreted.
We now sketch how we envisage their physical interpretations. We will adapt the elemen-
tary ideas of the Frege-Carnap-Lewis framework for semantics (Frege 1892, Carnap 1947,
Lewis 1970). This will be easy work: two interpretation maps, IInt and IExt, will map from
our theories and models, to ‘meanings’ and to ‘the world’ respectively. These maps will
later be useful for discussing symmetries (in Section 3.1.2).
We recall that according to the Frege-Carnap-Lewis framework:—
(i) A word gets assigned: first, an intension (Carnap’s word: Frege’s is ‘Sinn’, or in
English, ‘sense’: roughly, ‘linguistic meaning’); and second, an extension (Carnap’s word:
Frege’s is ‘Bedeutung’, or in English, ‘reference/referent’: roughly, ‘the object or worldly
item mentioned’). Roughly speaking: our interpretation maps, IInt and IExt, will assign
intensions and extensions, respectively.
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(ii) A word’s intension is assigned to it, once and for all (making the simplifying
idealization that all words are univocal, and their linguistic meanings do not change).
But a word’s extension is assigned to it, relative to a possible world and to other features
of the context of use that together determine the reference. For example, the reference
of ‘the tallest Swede alive today’ depends not just on the possible world, but also on the
day of use. And in general, the set of features that together determine the reference is
large and open-ended (cf. Lewis 1980).
(iii) A singular term (such as a proper name ‘Aristotle’ or a definite description ‘the
capital of Denmark’) has as its extension, its bearer (in these examples: the man, the city
Copenhagen); while a one-place predicate (such as ‘...walks’) has as its extension its set of
instances (the set of walkers at the possible world and time in question); while similarly, a
two-place predicate (such as ‘... loves ...’) has as its extension its set of instances, i.e. the
set of ordered pairs where the first loves the second (at the possible world and time in
question), e.g. 〈Romeo, Juliet〉; and so on for predicates with three or more places.
(iv) Compositional rules describe how to assign intensions and extensions to gram-
matical phrases and thus to complete sentences, in terms of the intensions and extensions
of the component words. For example, ‘John walks’ is assigned, at a world W and time
t, the extension True (as against False) iff the reference of ‘John’ for (W, t) is in the set
of walkers for (W, t).
To adapt these ideas, (i) to (iv), to our theories and models, there are two points to
bear in mind. They seem to be stumbling blocks, or sources of confusion. But they are
easily surmounted and dispelled.
(a): Notice how the ideas above express contingency and transience: by postulating
a background set of possible worlds and times, they secure that a sentence’s truth-value
can be contingent (vary across the worlds) and transient (vary across the times). In
philosophical discussion of physics, contingency and transience are often expressed in a
corresponding way: the theory has many solutions, and typically a solution changes with
time. This is often expressed using the word model: a state at a time, or a temporal
sequence of states (a trajectory through the state-space) is called ‘a model of the theory’.
Thus recall that this was connotation (i) at the start of Section 1.1. The stumbling block
is of course that since Section 1, we have reserved ‘model’ for a very different use: for
what many would call ‘specific theory’, i.e. for a notion that encompasses many solutions
throughout time. But we take it that one can surmount this stumbling block, and avoid
confusion, just by recognising our stipulated usage.
(b): The ideas, (i) to (iv), were of course developed to give semantics for language
about ordinary objects, such as people and towns, like Aristotle, Romeo and Copenhagen.
But when one considers one of Section 2.2’s theories or models, one is hard pressed to
find mention of objects: at least, of objects in the plural. For undoubtedly, ‘most of the
talk’ in the theory or model is about the various states and quantities, about which so
many details are given. But these are surely not objects, but rather properties. Namely,
properties of the one object—the physical system itself—being theorized about. Agreed:
if the system is composite, one naturally regards its component systems as objects in their
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own right.13 But the main point remains: most of the talk in a theory or model is about
(numerically quantifiable) properties, and their intricate (quantitative) relationships, not
about objects. But this second stumbling block is, like the first, minor. For nothing
prohibits interpretations using just one object, viz. the system; or just the system and its
component subsystems. (Besides, though we will not go into details: nothing prohibits
interpretations treating as objects what are in fact properties; cf. e.g. Lewis (1970a: 429).)
Bearing in mind (a) and (b), we can now spell out how interpretation maps, IInt and
IExt, assign intensions and extensions, respectively—once we are given a bare theory T ,
or a bare model M . We will discuss the assignment to an element of the set of quantities:
i.e. for T , an element of Q in the triple T = 〈S,Q,D〉; and for M , an element of Q¯
in the triple M = 〈S¯, Q¯, D¯〉. (Recall from the end of Section 2.2.3 that Q¯ is all the
quantities in the model, and is intuitively ‘larger’ than QM , which is the realization of
T ’s Q in the quadruple M = 〈SM ,QM ,DM , M¯〉.) But to stress that this element is
uninterpreted/abstract, we will call it a, not Q. It will be obvious how the corresponding
assignments get made for an element interpreted as a state, or as a dynamics.
For IInt, the idea is: IInt assigns to an element a of T or M , a physical quantity
understood in general terms. For example, a could be an element of an abstract C*-
algebra, abelian for classical mechanics and non-abelian for quantum mechanics. And
IInt(a) could be the quantity, position: which in philosophical terms, is a property with
numerically measurable degrees. Or perhaps IInt(a) is, more specifically, position in the
x direction, using such-and-such point as spatial origin, and using axes and length-unit
thus and so.
Two comments are in order, here. First: We thus envisage a ‘Platonic realm’ of
numerically measurable properties as the codomain of the function IInt. But our ‘realism’
about quantities is milder than it might appear; and anyway, nothing in what follows
will depend on it. In particular, (i): nothing will depend on our taking intensions to
encode conventional choices such as spatial origin, axis-direction and length-unit. Besides,
(ii): we do not need ‘trans-theoretic identity’ for quantities. That is, a quantity like
position need not be ‘the very same quantity’ in different theories: especially if they are
radically different, e.g. classical mechanics and quantum mechanics. Despite the single
word ‘position’, IInt(a) can be different quantities, according as a is in an abelian, or
non-abelian, C*-algebra.
Second: Note that we do not need to be precise about the exact domain of definition
of IInt. For we are only sketching how we envisage interpretation proceeding; and there
is of course a great deal of convention about how to formalize both T and M , and thus
13Also agreed: it is common, and mathematically natural, to consider the set S of all states, with
quantities as extra structure on S: e.g. in classical mechanics, as real-valued functions on the phase space
S, and in quantum mechanics, as linear operators on the Hilbert space S. But this does not make it
compulsory to treat states as the basic objects in a semantics of a physical theory. For it is equally
legitimate, though less common in textbooks, to start with the set Q of quantities, and take states as
extra structure on Q. And the legitimacy of both these approaches shows that au fond, a state is an
assignment of numerical values to all quantities; and mutatis mutandis a quantity is an assignment of
numerical values to all states. For now, the point is just that if one is asked to classify states and
quantities in either of the philosophical categories of ‘object’ and ‘ property’, undoubtedly one should
classify both states and quantities as properties.
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about what is the exact domain of definition of IInt.
For IExt, the idea is similar, except that we need to allow for the fact that extensions
are assigned relative to a possible world and to all the other features of the context of
use that together determine reference. Interpreting any theory or model T or M means
taking it to be used to describe some empirical phenomena: i.e. taking there to be, in an
appropriate possible world, a context of use with a rich enough set of features to determine
reference for the elements of T or M .14
For example, let a be again an element of an abstract C*-algebra: say, an abelian one,
because T is a bare theory that is to be interpreted as classical mechanics. Suppose that
the possible world W contains two classical point particles; and we take T to be used in
a context sufficiently rich that a successfully refers to the position of the more massive
particle; or perhaps more specifically, its position in the x direction, using such-and-such
place in W as spatial origin, and using axes and length-unit thus and so. Then relative to
W and this assumed context of use, IExt(a) is defined to be: the heavier particle’s position.
2.4 Isomorphisms: defining theories by abstraction from models
So far, we have taken a theory T as given, and then considered its models M . In this
Subsection, we note that one can argue in the opposite direction: i.e. one can approach
defining a theory starting from a class of models. The idea is a widespread one: to define
a notion (here, a theory) as those features in common between a suitably varied class of
examples (here, models).15 This is what earlier we called the ‘common core’ of the models
(in Sections 1.1-(c), and 1.2.2, 2.1-(3)). We will begin within our previous perspective,
i.e. with a theory as given, to introduce notation; then we will sketch how to define a
theory, ‘arguing in the opposite direction’.
So recall from Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 that a bare theory T can have various models
and model roots, Mi and mi, where i is in some index set I. These ‘realize’ the theory, in
the senses (‘instantiate’ or ‘represent’) discussed in Section 2.2.2. But they are in general
not isomorphic to each other, nor to the theory: we in general do not have mi ∼= mj ∼= T .
And even if there is an isomorphism: it is not an identity, because each mi is a realization
of T built using the model’s specific structure M¯i: it is not a ‘pure copy’ of T .
Supposing there is an isomorphism between a model root mi and the theory T , we
denote it by fi : mi → T , i ∈ I. Of course, mi is in general not a single set, but an n-
tuple or family of sets: often endowing some base set in the family with structure, e.g. the
14We say ‘appropriate’ so as to signal that of course, for any T or M , not every possible world has
a context rich enough to determine reference for all T ’s or M ’s elements. Indeed: for many worlds, all
their contexts will determine reference for none of T ’s or M ’s elements. For example, take T or M to be
supersymmetric theories, and a world with no supersymmetric physics. So whatever our precise definition
of the domain (i.e. set of arguments) of the map IExt, the map will surely be partial, i.e. undefined on
some, maybe the majority, of its arguments. But that is no problem. Formal semantics and philosophy
of language in the Frege-Carnap-Lewis framework have long had various proposals for how to treat words
and phrases that lack extensions (called ‘bearerless terms’); and these proposals can be adapted to our
T or M .
15This line of thought is not only widespread, but has a long tradition: for thousands of years in
philosophical accounts of abstraction; and for a hundred and fifty years in mathematics, with e.g. Frege’s
proposal to define notions as equivalence classes (e.g. a direction as an equivalence class of parallel lines).
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structure of an algebra. In particular, with a theory taken as a triple, T = 〈S,Q,D〉,
each mi is a triple mi = 〈SMi ,QMi ,DMi〉. So the domain and codomain of fi are triples,
so that fi is actually a triple of maps that map respectively: states to states, quantities
to quantities, and dynamics to dynamics.16 We will, however, not need to indicate this
in our notation.
Likewise, let the maps fij : mi → mj (i, j ∈ I) denote isomorphisms—when they
exist—between two model roots. But again, our notation will not need to indicate the
precise domains and codomains of these maps.
Now in the opposite direction. Suppose we are given, not a theory T , but a set of
models indexed by I: we write this set as {Mi : i ∈ I}. Similarly, we write the set of
model roots indexed by I as {mi : i ∈ I}. Thus we are not assuming that these models,
or these model roots, are given as realizing a theory. But we do assume that the model
roots (and the models) have some kind of structure, so that it makes sense to say that
some pair of model roots is isomorphic with respect to that kind of structure. The idea
now is to define a theory as ‘what is in common’ among a suitable set of model roots;
where ‘what is in common’ will be expressed as an equivalence class of an appropriate
equivalence relation.
The most obvious implementation of this idea is to define equivalence as just the given
notion of isomorphism that we assumed applies to the model roots. Thus we might define
two model roots mi, mj (i, j ∈ I) to be equivalent, mi ∼ mj, just in case there is an
isomorphism fij : mi → mj between them. Then the proposal would be: a theory is an
equivalence class under this equivalence relation. Recall for example the way in which
Frege (1884: Sections 64-67), defined a direction as an equivalence class of straight lines
under the relation of being parallel.
But if we apply this proposal to model roots, it has the trivial consequence that all
model roots of a theory thus defined are isomorphic. And as we have discussed above, we
must allow a theory to have non-isomorphic model roots.17
So the obvious implementation of the initial idea stumbles. If we want to define a
theory as ‘what is in common’ among model roots, and express ‘what is in common’ as an
equivalence class, then we need a more judicious—no doubt, a weaker—choice of equiv-
alence relation than isomorphism. We will not go into details about how to make this
choice. We doubt that there are general rules. But we note that it will be guided by two
desiderata:
16The first two maps will be isomorphisms, the last an equivariance condition: we will say more about
this in Section 3.2.1.
17Similarly, if we apply this proposal to models: all models of a theory thus defined are isomorphic.
Of course: we expect that since a model M has specific structure M¯ going beyond its model root m,
isomorphism for models will in general be stronger—i.e. lead to smaller equivalence classes—than does
isomorphism of model roots. But in this Section we will not need to linger on this model vs. model root
contrast. For our main concern is defining a theory using isomorphism of model roots. As we will argue
below (at the end of this Subsection), there is a natural constraint that model roots must be sufficiently
varied. For mistaking the presence of accidental similarities between the model roots one happens to
have at hand for necessary similarities between all the model roots of the theory one is trying to define,
leads to unnecessarily, or perhaps undesirably, restrictive theories. This is a fortiori true of the models
Mi of the theory: since the specific structure M¯i is specific to Mi, and so in general not shared with the
another model.
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(i): our previous understanding (maybe partial understanding) of the theory we
are trying to define: the choice is meant to pick out just the structure of the theory we
intuitively intend;
(ii): our expectation that the model roots will end up being representations, in
the mathematical sense, of the theory thus defined (and so, in general, non-isomorphic to
each other).
We will close by mentioning another constraint. It is partly independent of the question
of choosing an equivalence relation. For it is about the membership of the class of models
or model roots one begins with, rather than the judicious choice one must make of an
equivalence relation over it.
Namely: if this whole approach to defining theories is to work—i.e. is to define theories
of the kind we intended in our original conception—then the model roots must be suf-
ficiently varied that there are no ‘accidental commonalities’ between them, which would
then be inadvertently encoded in the theory defined as an equivalence class—thereby lim-
iting the theory’s possibilities of representation. The point is familiar, e.g. from Frege’s
example. If one imagines the lines can be coloured, then Frege’s approach to defining
direction needs the lines to vary in colour sufficiently. For if all the lines in a given par-
allelism equivalence class were the same colour, Frege’s definition of the corresponding
direction, viz. as that class, would inadvertently be ambiguous between (i) the direction,
as we originally intended it, and (ii) the unintended common colour. Hence our mention-
ing, in the opening paragraph of this Subsection, ‘a suitably varied class of examples’.
We will not go into details about this constraint. But we stress that obviously, it
is substantive. For recall how on the original ‘theory-first’ approach in Section 2.2, we
stressed that a model root m = TM is not a ‘pure copy’ of the theory T , but is built
from the model M ’s specific structure M¯ . So on the present ‘reverse’, or ‘models-first’,
approach: the danger is that if a class of model roots is not sufficiently varied, they may
have considerable specific structure in common (like colour for Frege’s lines)—which will
therefore be inadvertently encoded in theories defined as equivalence classes of model
roots. We will come back to this point in Section 5.4.18
3 Duality and Symmetry
In this Section, we first develop our treatment of symmetry (Section 3.1). This, together
with our discussion in Section 2, sets us up to present (at last!) our schema for duality
as isomorphism of models (Section 3.2).
18Agreed: one does not always get to ‘choose’ one’s model roots (or models), and so this constraint
cannot always be implemented. Thus there is judgment involved in this process of abstraction, viz. of
(i) how many, and how varied, the model roots should be, to provide representations of one’s theory,
and (ii) how to make the distinction, for a given model, between model root and specific structure (since
part of the specific structure of a model could be mistaken for e.g. additional information about the
theory). We therefore maintain that this reverse approach, from model roots to theory, is not deductive
but inductive—which brings us back to our Hilbertian theme from Section 1. It only stops when one
is happy with the theory—based on whatever independent criteria one uses to judge one’s theory and
models.
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3.1 Symmetries of theories and their models
We mentioned symmetry in Section 1.1’s closing analogy between a symmetry mapping a
state to a state that is ‘the same’, and a duality mapping a theory to a theory that is ‘the
same’. But we now can say more about symmetries, using: (A) our distinction between
theories and models (from Section 2.2); and (B) our interpretation maps (from Section
2.3). We take up these topics in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, respectively.
About (A), our main point will be that the symmetries of a bare (or indeed, an
interpreted) theory, and the symmetries of a model of it, are in general overlapping, but
distinct, sets. In particular, the symmetries of a theory can be a proper subset of the
symmetries of its model: and beware—this inclusion is in the opposite direction from
that for the other, more common, use of ‘model’, viz. as a solution, or representative of a
solution, of a theory.
About (B), our main point will be that a symmetry must ‘commute’ in an appropriate
sense with interpretation. Both these points, and our other ones, will be uncontroversial.
3.1.1 Symmetries of uninterpreted theories and models
Recall the usual conception of symmetry as a map a on states that preserves the values
of a salient, usually large, set of quantities: the state s and the image-state a(s) have the
same values for quantities. This prompts three immediate comments.
(i): Agreed, it is also usual to think of a symmetry as a map on quantities that
preserves values on a salient, usually large, set of states: i.e. for a given state, the value
of the argument-quantity equals the value of the image-quantity. But there is no conflict
here: the two conceptions are related by duality—in the mathematical, not physical,
sense! That is: one map is the (mathematical) dual of the other.
In more detail: given any map a : S → S, we can define its dual map (not to be
confused with a ‘duality map!’) on quantities, a∗ : Q → Q, by requiring that for any
s ∈ S and Q ∈ Q: 〈a∗(Q), s〉 := 〈Q, a(s)〉. And similarly, starting with quantities: given
any map a : Q → Q, we say that its dual map on states, a∗ : S → S, is defined by
requiring for all arguments: 〈Q, a∗(s)〉 := 〈a(Q), s〉.
(ii): Recall the question at the end of Section 1.1: do a state s, and its image a(s)
under a symmetry, represent the same physical state of affairs (‘possible world’)? Our
answer there was, roughly: ‘In general, No: but the ‘Yes’ cases are a natural focus of
interest’. We will return to this when discussing interpretation, in Section 3.1.2.19
19For the moment, we just note that it is also common to think that a symmetry as a map on states is
‘active’, i.e. the image-state must be a different physical state of affairs (so the question’s answer is ‘No’),
while a symmetry as a map on quantities is ‘passive’, i.e. the image-quantity and the argument-quantity
(each with their common value) describe the single given physical state (so that now the question’s answer
is ‘Yes’).
We will deny this. There is no universal association of symmetry as a map on states as ‘active’, and
symmetry as a map on quantities as ‘passive’. The reason lies, essentially, in the distinction between a
mathematical state and a physical state: (in the jargon of ‘gauge’, the latter is a gauge-equivalence class
of the former). That is: we of course concede that a symmetry as a map on states is ‘active’, in the sense
that it changes the states. That is a tautology: (except for the degenerate case where the symmetry is
given as being the identity map!). But this concession does not imply that a symmetry as a map on
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(iii): We have discussed symmetries as preserving values. But it is common to
also require that a symmetry ‘preserves the dynamics’. Taking a symmetry as a map on
states, this means, roughly: if a sequence of states is possible under the dynamics, so is
the sequence of image-states. That is: if a possible time-evolution is represented by a
temporal sequence of states, with the state at time t being s(t) (a ‘Schro¨dinger picture’
of time-evolution), then the sequence a(s(t)) of states is also possible.20 A corresponding
definition can be given for when we take a symmetry as a map on quantities, and use
a ‘Heisenberg picture’ of time-evolution as given by a sequence of quantities, i.e. by the
sequence of their values on a single ‘fixed’ state.
These comments (i)-(iii) bring out two points. The second is longer: it addresses
symmetries of models, pointing out that these are in general overlapping but distinct (as
abstract groups) from symmetries of theories; and that in the special case where a model
triple is isomorphic to the bare theory, the symmetries of the theory can be a proper
subset of the symmetries of its model.
First: it is clear that discussing symmetries returns us to Section 2.2’s more detailed
conception of a theory, even a bare one, as a triple comprising a set of states, a set of
quantities and a dynamics: T := 〈S,Q,D〉, together with a set of rules for evaluating
quantities.
Second: it is clear that comments (i)-(iii) carry over exactly to models in our sense,
viz. a realization (‘a more detailed version’) of a theory T , with specific structure of
its own. Recall that Section 2.2.3 introduced two notations for models in this sense.
Both notations will be useful in what follows: the first notation immediately, the second
notation in the next Subsection. (The second notation was simpler: since a model is itself
a triple of its own sets of states, quantities and a dynamics, we wrote: M = 〈S¯, Q¯, D¯〉.
It means we can define and discuss ‘symmetry of a model’ just as we did symmetries of
theories, e.g. as an automorphism of the state-space S¯ preserving values of a large salient
subset of Q¯.)
Section 2.2.3’s first notation distinguishes the realization of the theory’s triple from
the specific structure M¯ , and gives a subscript M to the former to signal that it is built
out of the latter: M = 〈SM ,QM ,DM , M¯〉 (Eq. (2)). We also wrote this as M =: 〈m, M¯〉 ,
where m := TM := 〈SM ,QM ,DM〉 is the model triple. This notation brings out that for
any theory T and any of its models M , there is a natural condition for a symmetry a of
T to be itself realized in M : for it to have, so to speak, a ‘shadow’ in the model M , i.e. in
states must change the physical state of affairs represented: for the states in question could yet be ‘merely’
mathematical. That is: one still needs a further argument why a difference of these states must imply
a difference of physical state (and thus why the question’s answer is ‘No’). This distinction, between
a mathematical and a physical symmetry, was labelled, in De Haro et al. (2017: Section 2), with the
label (Redundant); and in De Haro (2016a: Section 1.1.2.b), as (Physical)-(Redundant). It also roughly
corresponds to the distinction, in Caulton (2015), between an ‘analytic’ and a ‘synthetic’ symmetry.
20If the dynamics is deterministic, we can write s(t) = Dt,t0(s(t0)) where Dt,t0 represents the deter-
ministic dynamics; and then ‘preserving the dynamics’ is equivalent to the commutation i.e. equivariance
condition, a(s(t)) ≡ a(Dt,t0(s(t0))) = Dt,t0(a(s(t0))).
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S a−−→ Syθ yθ
SM aM−−→ SM





Figure 2: Commutativity of group automorphism a1 with group homomorphism θ.
the model triple. This condition is that a diagram should commute, and is not automatic.
To state this condition, however, we need a bit more notation about realization. We
will write it as a map θ. And we will suppose that in T we treat symmetries as maps
on states, so that a : S → S preserves the value of all quantities in a salient subset,
say Q0, of the set of all quantities Q. Then in the usual case where ‘realization’ means
‘representation’, we can take θ as an appropriate structure-preserving map: from S in
the theory T itself, to SM in the representing model triple m = TM = 〈SM ,QM ,DM〉.
Then the condition in question—that the symmetry a is itself realized in M—is that there
should be a map aM : SM → SM , such that the diagram in Figure 1 commutes.
To convey this idea less abstractly, think of the simplest case. Let the bare theory
be just a group G1,
21 with an automorphism a1 : G1 → G1; and suppose a group G2
represents G1 thanks to the existence of a homomorphism θ : G1 → G2. So G2 ∼= G1/ker θ.
For there to be a homomorphism of G2, h : G2 → G2 (even homomorphism: let alone
automorphism), that realizes a1 (counts as a1’s ‘shadow’ in G2) requires commutation:
i.e. for all g1 ∈ G1, θ(a1(g1)) = h(θ(g1)). Or as a diagram, see: Figure 2.
In the special case where the model triple is isomorphic to the bare theory, this dis-
cussion of course simplifies. Then the map θ will be an isomorphism, and the map aM
(or h in the toy example of groups) will trivially exist, and both the above diagrams will
trivially commute. In this case, a symmetry of the theory has a ‘duplicate’, or ‘replica’, in
the symmetries of the model—so that in effect, the symmetries of the theory are a subset
of the symmetries of the model. We say ‘in effect’ just because of the different domains of
definition: S vs. SM . Apart from this ‘in effect’, there are two comments to make about
this special, simplified, case.
(1): First, we note that on the other use of ‘model’ as an individual solution of
21Together with a set of maps to the real numbers, to express evaluation of the quantities. But for
simplicity we ignore these maps for the moment.
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a theory, a model is in general less symmetric than its theory—as is often remarked,
with the buzz-word ‘symmetry-breaking’. A solution of a dynamics with a spherically
symmetric Hamiltonian need not be spherically symmetric; a cubical crystal lattice with
one particular placing of its lattice points, and one particular orientation of its edges, can
be a solution of a dynamics that is translation-invariant and isotropic; and so on. So: the
subset-inclusion in our case above is in the opposite direction from that holding for the
other use of ‘model’.
(2): Besides, ‘subset’ here will usually mean proper subset. That is: a model’s specific
structure M¯—its ‘content’ that goes beyond its being a model/realization of T—will mean
the model has symmetries additional to those that are ‘duplicates’ of the symmetries of T .
And we expect that if these additional symmetries are well-defined on the model triple, or
if they naturally induce a symmetry there, that symmetry is trivial, i.e. just the identity
map on the model triple. Our prototypical cases of representations of a group or algebra
give examples. Perhaps the simplest is as follows. Let T be the real numbers IR; and
let M be the complex numbers |C which of course represents IR as the real axis, i.e. the
complex numbers with zero imaginary part, {z ∈ |C | z = x+i0, x ∈ IR}. So this latter set,
the real axis, is like the model triple. Then M has the symmetry of complex conjugation
z 7→ z¯ which is indeed well-defined on the real axis: but there, it is just the identity map.
And there are examples in interesting cases of dualities. In gauge-gravity dualities,
De Haro (2017a) showed that a certain subgroup of the diffeomorphism group of the
gravity model of the theory (roughly, the diffeomorphisms which preserve the asymptotic
boundary conditions) was ‘invisible’ to the gauge model of the theory, in the sense of not
representing any difference on that model: and so these diffeomorphisms are not in the
common core between the two models, and they are trivially represented on the theory.
The same verdict was made in De Haro (2016a: §2.2.3) for the ‘gauge symmetries’ of the
gauge side of the duality. These are not visible on the gravity side: they are symmetries
of the formulation of the gauge model of the theory, and are trivially represented on the
theory.
To sum up this discussion of the symmetries of a bare theory, and those of its models,
and of its model-triples: there are really three points here:
(i): A bare theory T is realized—typically: represented in the mathematical sense—
by one of its model triples, m. The model M then consists of m and some specific
structure M¯ ; (cf. Section 2.2.3). And representation requires only a homomorphism, not
an isomorphism. Hence our articulating in this Section the condition—in terms of a
commuting diagram—for a symmetry of T to be itself realized in m.
(ii): And even if in some given case, the representation is an isomorphism, i.e. the
representing model triple is isomorphic to the theory T , so that any symmetry a of T will
indeed have a ‘duplicate’ or ‘replica’ symmetry in the model triple: still, we must expect
that the model (as against the model triple) has its own specific structure M¯ . And this
specific structure may have symmetries that m, and the theory T , ‘knows nothing of’:
(cf. comment (2) just above).
(iii): Furthermore, different models, and therefore model triples, of a bare theory
are in general not isomorphic (as we also discussed in Section 2.4). However, our example
of boson-fermion duality, in Section 4, will not illustrate this in detail: i.e. all the model
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triples will be isomorphic. (But see the comments in Section 5.4.)
3.1.2 Interpretations respect symmetries
Recall from Section 2.3 that once we are given a bare theory T , or a bare model M , the
interpretation maps IInt and IExt assign intensions and extensions (respectively) to, for
example, an element a of the set of quantities: i.e. for T , an element of Q in the triple
T = 〈S,Q,D〉; and for M , an element of Q¯ in the triple M = 〈S¯, Q¯, D¯〉. (And similarly
for assigning intensions and extensions to states and dynamics.) Thus IInt assigns to an
element a of T or M , a physical quantity, e.g. position (or more specifically, position in the
x direction, using such-and-such spatial origin), understood in general terms. Similarly,
IExt assigns a an extension relative to a possible world W and the other features of the
context of use that together determine reference. For example, W and the context of use
may determine that a is assigned the position of the more massive of two classical point
particles that are in W .
We now propose that these interpretation maps should satisfy appropriate meshing
conditions whereby they form commuting diagrams with symmetry maps. The reason
is simply that this reflects what one usually means by ‘interpretation’ of the formalism
of a physical theory. And this is so whether ‘formalism of a physical theory’ is (in our
senses) a bare theory, or a bare model; and whether ‘interpretation’ refers to intension or
extension.
Thus to take a very simple example: suppose that a state describes three classical point
particles forming a scalene triangle, stationary in an absolute Newtonian space, and (for
more simplicity) that the particles do not interact; and suppose the bare theory, or model,
at issue has spatial translation and rotation as symmetries. Taking symmetries as maps
on states (as usual): these suppositions mean that a spatially translated and-or rotated
state has the same values as the given state, for a large and salient set of quantities. So far,
these suppositions are, officially, at the level of a bare theory or model—though of course
words like ‘point particles’,‘scalene triangle’ and ‘Newtonian space’ suggest interpretation.
And indeed: reading these suppositions, one tends to read them as interpreted, i.e. to
unconsciously apply the interpretation maps I—where I is short for both IInt and IExt. In
any case: applying these maps to the two bare states, say s and T (s) (‘T’ for ‘transform’
or ‘translate and-or rotate’), one concludes that for the act of interpretation to respect the
given symmetries, the interpretations I(s) and I(T (s)) (where again: I is short for both
IInt and IExt) must have the same values for a large and salient set of quantities—namely,
of course, for the interpretations of the bare quantities. This is exactly the condition that
symmetry and interpretation form a commuting diagram. But to write such diagrams
down, we will need a bit more notation.22
The reasons we need more notation are as follows. So far:
(1): We did not spell out that the domain of each of IInt and IExt would include
22Agreed, to impose this commutation condition for every symmetry and every interpretation is con-
tentious. It seems best justified when we envisage that the bare theory or model describes the whole
universe; so that for the example of three point particles, there are no other material bodies in the uni-
verse. But in this paper, we do not need to assess exactly when the commutation condition is justified.
See De Haro (2016a: §1.3-§1.4), especially the condition called ‘unextendability’.
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states and quantities and dynamics; so that each of IInt and IExt is really a triple of three
maps from states to states, from quantities to quantities, and from dynamics to dynam-
ics. (This is just like an isomorphism fi in Section 2.4 being really a triple of such maps;
cf. footnote 16.)
(2): We have not introduced notation for the codomains of the interpretation maps:
for what one might call the ‘realm of intension’, or ‘meanings’, for IInt, and for what one
might call the ‘realm of extension’, or the ‘world’, for IExt.
(3): Nor did we introduce a notation for symmetry maps defined on the ‘realm
of intension’ or on the ‘realm of extension’. Indeed, we did not yet do this: neither (a)
on the states therein (generally understood, in the realm of intension, and specific to a
particular physical system, in the realm of extension), analogous to the symmetry maps
a : S → S on the states of a bare theory; nor (b) on the quantities therein (generally
understood, in the realm of intension, and specific to a particular physical system, in the
realm of extension), analogous to the symmetry maps a∗ : Q → Q on the quantities of a
bare theory (which are mathematical duals of the maps a : S → S).
To avoid a lot of extra notation, we shall only act on (2) and (3) above. That is:
(2’): We now denote the codomains of the interpretation maps IInt and IExt by,
respectively: ‘Sinn’ (in honour of Frege’s German word for the realm of intension) and
‘Bed’ (short for ‘Bedeutung’, which was Frege’s word for referent, such as the bearer of a
name).
(3’): We confine ourselves to treating symmetries as maps on states (treating them
as maps on quantities would be parallel). So we now denote a symmetry on the states in
‘Sinn’ as aInt, where the superscript Int corresponds to the subscript in IInt. And we now
denote a symmetry on the states in ‘Bed’ as aExt, where the superscript Ext corresponds
to the subscript in IExt.
Putting (2’) and (3’) together, we write a state-space in the realm of intension as SSinn,
and a state-space in the realm of extension as SBed. So we write: aInt : SSinn → SSinn; and
we write aExt : SBed → SBed.
But we shall not act on (1) above: the notation would be cumbersome, and without
compensating advantages. In short: acting only on (2) and (3) above—i.e. introducing
‘Sinn’ and ‘Bed’, with symmetry maps aInt and aExt respectively—is enough to enable us
to draw the required commuting diagrams.
We spell these out: first for the realm of intension, then for the realm of extension.
In each case, we first draw the diagram for a bare theory T taken as a triple, T =
〈S,Q,D〉; and then draw the diagram for a bare model M taken as a triple M = 〈S¯, Q¯, D¯〉.
(Note that these diagrams do not reflect Section 3.1.1’s discussion about the overlap but
distinctness (in general) of symmetries of a theory T , and symmetries of its model M .)
Thus for the realm of intension, we have: for a bare theory T with state-space S, the
diagram in Figure 3. For a bare model M with state-space S¯, we have the diagram in
Figure 4.
Strictly speaking, we should in diagrams in Figure 4 and Figure 3 distinguish two
interpretation maps—both of which we have in fact written as IInt—according as the
domain of definition is the state-space of a bare theory or of a bare model. But like in
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S a−−→ SyIInt yIInt
SSinn a
Int−−→ SSinn
Figure 3: Commutativity of the symmetry a with the interpretation map IInt for T .
S¯ a−−→ S¯yIInt yIInt
S¯Sinn a
Int−−→ S¯Sinn
Figure 4: Commutativity of the symmetry a with the interpretation map IInt for M .
comment (1) above: the precision is not worth the burden of extra notation. And similarly
of course, for the next two diagrams about the realm of extension.
For the realm of extension, we have, at some given possible world W and context of
use sufficiently rich to determine references (i.e. to avoid the interpretation maps being
undefined on the given arguments): for a bare theory T with state-space S, the diagram
in Figure 5.
For a bare model M with state-space S¯, we have the diagram in Figure 6.
3.2 Duality as isomorphism of models
We turn in this last Subsection to our proposal that a duality is an isomorphism of
models of a bare theory. To be precise: it is an isomorphism of model triples of a bare
theory. Indeed, after all the stage-setting of the previous Subsections (!), the proposal is
straightforward. We first give its details, using the notations we have established (Section
3.2.1). In Section 3.2.2, we argue that our notion of duality is logically weak but physically
strong. Then in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, we turn to how duality relates to the topics of
Sections 2.3 and 3.1: interpretations and symmetries.
S a−−→ SyIExt yIExt
SBed a
Ext−−→ SBed
Figure 5: Commutativity of the symmetry a with the interpretation map IExt for T .
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S¯ a−−→ S¯yIExt yIExt
S¯Bed a
Ext−−→ S¯Bed
Figure 6: Commutativity of the symmetry a with the interpretation map IExt for M .
3.2.1 Duality as isomorphism
Our basic idea is that a duality is an isomorphism between two triples, each compris-
ing a state-space endowed with appropriate structure, a set of quantities endowed with
appropriate structure, and a dynamics, consistent with that structure.23 ‘Isomorphism
between triples’ is of course short for a triple of maps: an isomorphism between the two
state-spaces, and isomorphism between the sets (almost always: algebras, cf. footnote
23) of quantities, and an equivariance condition on the dynamics.24 In addition, the
isomorphism must commute with the symmetries of the theory, as sketched in Section
3.1.
More important is the question of which kinds of triples are related by duality. Re-
calling our distinction between bare theories and their more specific models, the answer
is clear: a duality relates two model triples of a single bare theory.
The crucial point here is that the model triple is separated from the model’s own
specific structure, and expresses only the model’s realizing (typically: representing in the
mathematical sense) the bare theory. Recall the notation from Eq. (2) in Section 2.2.3:
M = 〈SM ,QM ,DM , M¯〉 =: 〈m, M¯〉 , where m := TM := 〈SM ,QM ,DM〉 is the model
triple. We emphasised already in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 that two model triples are in
general not isomorphic to each other, nor to the bare theory. So the assertion of duality
is substantive: it asserts that two model triples are in fact isomorphic.
But this is not to say that the two models, each ‘considered in their entirety’, are
23As we mentioned in Section 2.2.1, ‘appropriate structure’ here refers to: (i) the structure of the sets
of spaces and quantities, (ii) the rules for evaluating quantities, (iii) the structure which the dynamics
satisfies, (iv) the set of symmetries of the theory. We can now be more specific about these, for the
examples of quantum theories, which will illustrate our schema: (ia) the set of states will be a separable
Hilbert space; (ib) the quantities will be elements (normally the self-adjoint, renormalisable elements) of
an algebra; (ii) the rules for evaluating quantities are maps to the appropriate field: for most quantum
theories, the inner product on the Hilbert space, and the usual rules for evaluating matrix elements;
(iii) dynamical evolution will usually be a (unitary) map, satisfying appropriate commuting diagrams
with the other maps in the theory; (iv) the group of symmetries will comprise the automorphisms of the
algebra: and possibly additional symmetries, on the states and on the quantities. For classical theories,
these comments get modified in familiar ways: e.g. (ia) would say that the set of states is a manifold,
with structure appropriate to e.g. Lagrangian or Hamiltonian mechanics.
24Our proposal does not depend on the formulation of models as triples. A model root can be presented
in many different forms, and the isomorphism should then preserve the corresponding structure. Even
for triples, one can envisage isomorphisms which do not respect the triple structure, though they map
the model roots isomorphically. Compare Section 3.2.2. But it will suffice for our purposes to restrict to
model roots defined as triples, whose structure is preserved by the duality.
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isomorphic. They each have their own specific structure, and are (in almost all cases) not
isomorphic. Recall our other notation from Section 2.2.3 for models ‘considered in their
entirety’: M = 〈S¯, Q¯, D¯〉. Indeed, their being non-isomorphic is usually part of what
makes the duality surprising and (if Nature is kind to us!) empirically fruitful, i.e. of
scientific importance. And ‘the more non-isomorphic’—i.e. the more disparate the two
models, considered in their entirety, are—the more surprising, and (one hopes) empirically
fruitful, is the duality (cf. (2) and (3) in Section 2.1).25
We now introduce some notation for dualities as isomorphisms between model triples.
This will require first giving:
(1) some new notation for the value of a quantity on a state, and
(2) a more detailed discussion of dynamics (in both the ‘Schro¨dinger’ and ‘Heisen-
berg’ pictures).
Both (1) and (2) can be given wholly independently of our distinctions (i) between the-
ories and their models, and (ii) between interpreted and uninterpreted theories. So for
the moment, please consider a generic triple of a state-space, a set of quantities, and a
dynamics: 〈S,Q,D〉.26
(1): Suppose we are given a set of states S, a set of quantities Q and a dynamics D:
〈S,Q,D〉. We will write 〈Q, s〉 for the value of quantity Q in state s. This prompts two
further general points.
First: it is common to think of a state s ∈ S as a maximal specification of the in-
stantaneous properties of the system in question; and a quantity Q ∈ Q as a numerically
measurable property of it. In effect, this makes states and quantities nothing but assign-
ments of values to each other. Second: for classical physics, one naturally takes quantities
as real-valued functions on states, so that 〈Q, s〉 := Q(s) ∈ IR is the system’s possessed
or intrinsic value of the quantity; and for quantum physics, one naturally takes quantities
as linear operators on a Hilbert space of states, so that 〈Q, s〉 := 〈s|Qˆ|s〉 ∈ IR is the
system’s Born-rule expectation value of the quantity. But for quantum physics it is often
important to consider the non-diagonal matrix elements of a given quantity/operator Qˆ,
without requiring this to be adequately encoded in the Born-rule expectation values of
various other quantities. So for a quantum theory—as in the bosonization example of
Section 4 et seq.!—we should understand a value written schematically as 〈Q, s〉 to also
represent all the matrix elements 〈s1|Qˆ|s2〉. Thus 〈Q, s〉 is a short-hand for an expression
25We should put this last point more precisely, since our notion of bare theory is logically weak, with
even a group or an algebra, together with a set of maps to the real numbers, counting as a legitimate bare
theory: (cf. (1) in Section 2.1). And it is in general not surprising, nor likely to be empirically fruitful,
to learn that two very disparate models are both groups, or both algebras: (unless the maps to the real
numbers are so disparate that the existence of an isomorphism is not easy to guess). Thus the point here,
more precisely, is that, for a given degree of detail or logical strength in the bare theory (and the more,
the better!): the more disparate its models (considered in their entirety), the more surprising, and one
hopes fruitful, is their both realizing the bare theory. That is: the more surprising is the duality.
26This simpler idea of a triple was used in our earlier—cruder!—discussion of duality: cf. De Haro et
al. (2017: Section 3.2). There, the simplicity engendered no errors, since our general description of duality
was but a preamble to a specialist topic: an assessment of gauge symmetries in gauge-gravity duality.
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like 〈Q; s1, s2〉 := 〈s1|Qˆ|s2〉,27 i.e. Q is regarded as a map: S × S → |C.
(2) We turn to the dynamics D, i.e. a specification of how the values of quantities
change over time. We will keep the discussion very simple. First, we assume the dynamics
is deterministic: also in quantum theories, despite the threat of Schro¨dinger’s cat. Then
it can be presented in two ways, for which we adopt the quantum terminology, viz. the
‘Schro¨dinger’ and ‘Heisenberg’ pictures; (though the ideas occur equally in classical me-
chanics: for example the remark, frequent in the textbooks, that in Hamiltonian mechanics
time-evolution can be regarded as a sequence of canonical transformations, is in effect a
statement of the Heisenberg picture). But we shall not need to distinguish otherwise be-
tween the different detailed formalisms for dynamics, such as Hamiltonian vs. Lagrangian,
and the path-integral. Besides, we will adopt for simplicity the Schro¨dinger picture.
So we say: DS is an action of the real line IR representing time on S. There is an
equivalent Heisenberg picture of dynamics with DH , an action of IR representing time on
Q. The pictures are related by, in an obvious notation:
DS : IR×S 3 (t, s) 7→ DS(t, s) =: s(t) ∈ S iff DH : IR×Q 3 (t, Q) 7→ DH(t, Q) =: Q(t) ∈ S
(3)
where for all s ∈ S considered as the initial state, and all quantities Q ∈ Q, the values of
physical quantities at the later time t agree in the two pictures:
〈Q, s(t)〉 = 〈Q(t), s〉 . (4)
With the notations and notions of remarks (1) and (2) in hand, we can now present the
notation for dualities as isomorphisms between model triples. Let M1,M2 be two models,
with model triples m1 = 〈SM1 ,QM1 ,DM1〉 and m2 = 〈SM2 ,QM2 ,DM2〉. We can suppose
that M1,M2 are both models of a bare theory T . Or we can proceed in the ‘opposite
direction’ discussed in Section 2.4: that is, we can suppose that M1,M2 are given inde-
pendently of a bare theory T , but their model triples (model roots in the more general
language of Section 2.4) are isomorphic. Either way, the notation for dualities is as follows.
To say that the model triples m1,m2 are isomorphic is to say, in short, that: there are
isomorphisms between their respective state-spaces and sets of quantities, that (i) make
values match, and (ii) are equivariant for the two triples’ dynamics (in the Schro¨dinger
and Heisenberg pictures, respectively). We now spell this out. Though retaining the Ms
in the subscripts is cumbersome, we will do so, in order to emphasise our main conceptual
point: that duality is a relation between model triples in our sense—it is not between
theories, or between generic triples 〈S,Q,D〉 as in remarks (1) and (2).
Thus we say:— A duality between m1 = 〈SM1 ,QM1 ,DM1〉 and m2 = 〈SM2 ,QM2 ,DM2〉
requires:28
an isomorphism between the state-spaces (almost always: Hilbert spaces, or for
classical theories, manifolds):
ds : SM1 → SM2 using d for ‘duality’ ; (5)
27Therefore duality will imply unitary equivalence.
28See footnote 24 and Section 3.2.2 for a brief discussion of more general cases.
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Figure 7: Equivariance of duality and dynamics, for states and quantities.
and an isomorphism between the sets (almost always: algebras) of quantities
dq : QM1 → QM2 using d for ‘duality’ ; (6)
such that: (i) the values of quantities match:
〈Q1, s1〉1 = 〈dq(Q1), ds(s1)〉2 , ∀Q1 ∈ QM1 , s1 ∈ SM1 . (7)
and: (ii) ds is equivariant for the two triples’ dynamics, DS:1, DS:2, in the Schro¨dinger
picture; and dq is equivariant for the two triples’ dynamics, DH:1, DH:2, in the Heisenberg
picture: see Figure 7.
Eq. (7) appears to favour m1 over m2; but in fact does not, thanks to the maps d
being bijections.
It is already clear that a duality reduces to a symmetry, in the case where there is just
one model, and one model triple, at issue, i.e. M1 = M2 and m1 = m2. We shall return to
this topic in Section 3.2.4. First, we turn to the questions (i) whether our notion of duality
is too weak (Section 3.2.2) and (ii) how it relates to Section 2.3 topic of interpretation
(Section 3.2.3).
3.2.2 A logically weak but physically strong notion of duality
In Section 2.1, we admitted that our definition of duality is logically weak because there
is a duality whenever two models are isomorphic. Thus one might worry that, whenever
two given models share some common structure smaller than the model triples, they are
dual with respect to the substructures they share. In this Section, we argue that this
worry is unfounded, for models that purport to describe physical systems—which is our
concern in this paper. Thus the notion of duality is physically stronger than it would at
first seem. The point will be to distinguish between a purely formal model vs. a physical
(although uninterpreted) model. Our schema is intended for the latter: and it is only the
model triples, not their specific structure, that is physically significant.
We will illustrate this in an example. Consider, for simplicity, the following model,
based on the su(2) algebra:
M0 = 〈S0,Q0,D0〉 := 〈SJ , U(su(2)), C2(J)〉 . (8)
SJ is here the Hilbert space of irreducible representations of su(2) with total quantum
number J . U(su(2)) is the universal enveloping algebra of su(2), i.e. roughly, all pow-
ers of the algebra elements, quotiented by the algebra relations. The dynamics is the
Hamiltonian of the model, which we take to be C2(J), the second Casimir.
34
Let us compare M0 with a model M with which it shares a common structure, and
which is based on the su(2)⊗ su(2) algebra. The state space is: S = SJ ⊗ SK , where SJ
and SK are the state spaces of the first and the second su(2), respectively. J is the total
quantum number of the first su(2), and K is the total quantum number of the second
su(2). We take the dynamics to be given by the sum of the Casimirs of the two su(2)’s,
D = C2(J) + C2(K). This model is written as:
M = 〈S,Q,D〉 =
〈
SJ ⊗ SK , U (su(2)⊗ su(2)) , C2(J) + C2(K)
〉
, (9)
where U again indicates the universal enveloping algebra.
M0 and M are of course both representations of M0, i.e. M is a representation of su(2)
with as ‘extra structure’ the second su(2). In fact, M0 is isomorphic to M for the trivial
representation with K = 0, i.e. M0 ∼= M |K=0.
But M and M0 are not dual for arbitrary values of K (as in Eq. (9)). To see this, we
rewrite M in a way which makes explicit the common structure they share, i.e. the first
su(2). So, define:
M ′ := 〈m, M¯〉 , (10)
where m contains the first su(2), and the specific structure M¯ contains the second su(2).
Explicitly, m = 〈SJ , U(su(2)), C2(J)〉 and M¯ = 〈SK , U(su(2)), C2(K)〉. Thus, m and M¯
are both triples, and they are both isomorphic to M0, in particular m ∼= M0.
We can summarise the above definitions introducing the following short notation:
M0 ∼= m = J
M = J ⊗ K
M ′ = 〈J,K〉 , (11)
where J is short for the first factor of the tensor product and K for the second.
To reconstruct M = J ⊗ K from M ′ = 〈J,K〉, one takes the tensor products of the
states in J and K, takes all the products of the quantities, and adds up the dynamics, to
reproduce Eq. (9).
If we were to say that M = J ⊗K and its model quadruple counterpart, M ′ = 〈J,K〉,
are ‘the same’, then since it is true that M ′ = 〈J,K〉’s model triple and M0 ∼= J are
isomorphic: it would follow that M = J ⊗K and M0 would be dual in the relevant sense.
But notice that M ′ is not the same as M , nor is it isomorphic to it, because they differ
in what they regard as physically significant (cf. De Haro (2017: p.5)). Only the first
model triple, J, is physically significant in M ′, whereas both model triples are physically
significant in M . Thus there can be no isomorphism between M and M ′ as candidate
models of physics, for they differ in their physical content.
In other words, the difference is in a tensor product model presented as such (i.e. M =
J ⊗K) vs. a model quadruple that has as model triple the first factor J, and as its specific
structure the second factor K.
This argument reinforces the point that it is not necessary, nor desirable, to define
bare theories as equivalence classes of models. This means that the condition to have
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a duality is only that two model triples be isomorphic: but the model triples need not
be isomorphic to the bare theory, only homomorphic to it. And since, as we have just
seen, the isomorphism between dual models is essentially unique (i.e. it is not possible to
weaken the isomorphism to get dual structures, without changing their physical content),
there is no gain in requiring that duality must also involve the theory. If one starts with
a bare theory which is weaker than two isomorphic model triples that represent it, it may
be possible to strengthen it so as to match the two model triples: but there is no gain in
this. So, it is best to keep the notion of bare theory physically weak, and the notion of
duality physically strong.
We end with a contrast of the notions of duality in physics and mathematics. In
mathematics, just as in physics, ‘duality’ does not have a fixed meaning; however, all
the examples of duality involve just two theories. More precisely, the duality operation
generates the two-element group Z2. This is not so in the physics literature, where duality
can involve more than two models, and the duality group can be rich. For example, the S-
duality group of electric-magnetic duality is SL(2,Z), and string theories realize so-called
U-duality groups, which involve orthogonal and exceptional groups. Our schema allows
for dualities among many models, and so it is closer to the notion in physics. This also
strengthens the analogy between duality and symmetry, mentioned in Section 1.1-(2).
3.2.3 Duality and interpretation
So far, our discussion of interpretation has concerned a single theory or model. Thus recall
that Section 2.3 introduced interpretation maps IInt and IExt in a rather informal way, as
mapping from a bare i.e. uninterpreted theory or a bare model, to the realm of intension
(‘Sinn’), or to the realm of extension (‘Bed’), respectively. Then Section 3.1.2 laid out
how IInt and IExt are to mesh with symmetry maps. This amounted to a commutation
condition, i.e. IInt and IExt forming a commuting diagram with symmetry maps, which
for simplicity we only considered as defined on state-spaces: either on a bare state-space,
or on a state-space in the realm of intension (‘Sinn’), or on a state-space in the realm of
extension (‘Bed’). (Cf. the diagrams in Figures 3 to 6.) But again, everything in Section
3.1.2 concerned a single theory or model.
Since duality is about relations between theories/models, there is, at first sight, lit-
tle to say about duality and interpretation. That is: interpretation should simply pro-
ceed independently on the two sides of the duality—for example, we just require the
interpretation-symmetry commuting diagram on both sides of the duality. Indeed: we
said already at the start of Section 1.1 that in some cases of duality, the two sides were
clearly not—nor intended to be—physically or semantically equivalent: e.g. the high and
low temperature regimes in Kramers-Wannier duality. And our definition of duality as
formal (viz. an isomorphism of model triples) certainly allows this idea of ‘distinct but
isomorphic sectors of reality’—namely as the codomains of the interpretation maps on
the two sides of the duality.
This verdict—‘there is little to say’—is true, so far as it goes. And of course, it does not
forbid the other sort of case: where the two sides of the duality are physically/semantically
equivalent, i.e. do describe ‘the same sector of reality’. In our schema, this would be




IInt ↘ ↙ IInt
QSinn




IExt ↘ ↙ IExt
QBed
Figure 9: The two sides of the duality describe ‘the same sector of reality’, in the realm
of extension.
their codomain—so as to give a triangular, rather than square, commuting diagram. We
shall spell this out as regards the interpretation of (bare) quantities: similar diagrams
could of course be drawn for states.
For (bare) quantities being mapped by IInt into the realm of intension ‘Sinn’, the two
sides of a duality describing ‘the same sector of reality’ amounts to the diagram in Figure
8.
Similarly: for (bare) quantities being mapped by IExt into the realm of extension
‘Bed’—relative to some given possible world W with a context rich enough to determine
references, of course—the two sides of a duality describing ‘the same sector of reality’
amounts to Figure 9.
So far, so straightforward. But the above verdict is a bit quick: there are two further
points to make.
(1): What determines equivalence?:— First, there is the question what determines
whether the two sides of a duality are physically/semantically equivalent, i.e. describe the
same ‘sector of reality’. De Haro (2016) and Dieks et al. (2015)) have argued that the
choice between these two options should depend on whether the models in question are
given what was called an ‘internal’ or an ‘external’ interpretation. The idea is that for
the ranges of the interpretation maps to be distinct, there must be other facts, external to
the triples themselves and our use of them, that determine the distinct ranges. Typically,
these facts will be other pieces of physics to which the system described by each model
triple is coupled—with different pieces of physics on the two sides of the duality. This
coupling ‘breaks the symmetry’ between the two sides, and secures that the two model
triples are about distinct, albeit isomorphic, subject matters (‘sectors of reality’). In the
proposed jargon: the coupling provides an ‘external interpretation’ of the model triple.
On the other hand: sometimes we propose a physical theory as a putative theory of the
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whole universe, i.e. as a putative cosmology, so that according to the theory there are
no physical facts beyond those about the system (viz. universe) it describes. If in such a
case, there is a duality—which in our framework, means there are two isomorphic model
triples, each putatively describing the whole universe—then there can be no such cou-
pling to other pieces of physics. (Gauge-gravity duality provides, of course, a putative
example of such a duality between theories of the universe.) An interpretation of each
triple must therefore be what was labelled an ‘internal interpretation’; and this prompts
the conclusion that the two triples describe the very same ‘sector of reality’. That is: the
interpretation maps have the same range; and there is a triangular diagram, as in Figures
8 and 9.
(2): Interpreting the specific structure:— Second, there is more to say about the inter-
pretation of a model’s specific structure, especially in the latter sort of case, i.e. two sides
of a duality describing the same ‘sector of reality’.
Recall that a model M is more than the model triple m, by which it realizes a bare
theory, and which relates to another model triple in a duality. M also has a specific
structure M¯ : as we stressed at the start of Section 3.2.1, this structure is not related by the
duality to ‘the other side’. But the specific structure M¯ does get interpreted—it supplies
arguments for the interpretation maps IInt and IExt—just as much as the model triple m
gets interpreted.29 This was emphasised by the other notation for models introduced at
the end of Section 2.2.3: viz. a model is itself, like a bare theory, a triple. M ’s states and
quantities, being specific to M , are in general ‘bigger’/‘more structured’ than the states
and quantities of the bare theory that M models/realizes. We wrote them with a ‘bar’:
thus M = 〈S¯, Q¯, D¯〉. And recall that then Section 2.3 took elements of these ‘bigger’ sets
S¯, Q¯ as arguments for the interpretation maps IInt and IExt.
So the first point to make is: our discussion of duality has so far ignored the specific
structures M¯1 and M¯2 on the two sides, even though they do get interpreted. This silence
is presumably no problem in a case where we agree that the two sides are not physically or
semantically equivalent. In such a case, the interpretation of M¯1 and M¯2 just means there
are physical facts on each of the two sides, additional to the facts that are isomorphic with
(a subset of) facts on the other side.30 Thus for the case of Kramers-Wannier duality, the
obvious examples of such non-matching physical facts would be facts about the value of
the temperature: high on one side, and low on the other. In short: these additional facts
(in the realms of intension and extension, respectively) are: on one side, in the ranges
IInt(M¯1) and IExt(M¯1); and on the other side, in the ranges IInt(M¯2) and IExt(M¯2).
But what about the other sort of case: where the two sides do describe ‘the same
29At least, this is what we would in general expect. Agreed, one might interpret a model without
interpreting all of the specific structure M¯ : recall footnote 14 on the need to allow the interpretation
maps to be partial, i.e. to deliver no value for certain arguments. For more details, see Section 1.1.2.a of
De Haro (2016a).
30In Section 3.2.2, we emphasised the fact that only the model triples, and not the specific structure, are
physically significant. When we now consider external interpretations that do give a physical meaning
to the specific structure, we have to say that these interpretations change the physical content of the
model (its physical degrees of freedom). This is correct, because external interpretations do not need to
preserve the structure of the model as a quadruple.
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sector of reality’? Is it really satisfactory to say that there are physical facts that:
(a) are additional to those facts described by the isomorphic model triples, i.e. those
‘caught’ by the duality/the common bare theory; yet also
(b) fall into two such disparate subsets: one subset expressed by M¯1 and the other
subset expressed by M¯2?
In short: this world-picture, combining (i) a set of facts expressed by the two sides in the
same way (though this sameness may be not obvious—the duality can be surprising), and
(ii) two other sets of facts expressed in very different ways by the two sides, is surprising:
and maybe it is odd, or unsatisfactory ...
We saw examples of this in comment (3) of Section 2.1, for example in gauge-gravity
duality. Here, the set of facts that are the common core, a la (i), consists only in a class of
asymptotic operators and a conformal class of (d− 1)-dimensional metrics. And the sets
of facts a la (ii) include, on the bulk side, gravity (such as: Einstein’s equations coupled
to matter) in d dimensions expressed by M¯1, and on the boundary side, a conformal
field theory (such as: the Yang-Mills equations) in d − 1 dimensions expressed by M¯2.
See DeHaro (2016: Section 2.1, 2016a: Section 2.2) for a discussion in the context of our
schema.
For our example of bosonization, we will see in Section 5.2.4 how external interpreta-
tions map to different (sets of) worlds, while the internal interpretation maps to the same
(set of) world(s). For the latter interpretation to be possible, we will see that the worlds
must contain both bosonic and fermionic facts. So, the internal interpretation does not
efface the distinction between bosons and fermions, but distinguishes them and identifies
them in the world.
3.2.4 Combining duality and symmetries
In this Subsection, we turn to the relations between dualities and symmetries. There are
three comments to make. They are not controversial. Indeed, they simply gather some
threads from discussions in previous Sections. The first makes the obvious comparison be-
tween dualities and symmetries, and notes the conditions for a duality to reduce to being
a symmetry. The second is about a duality preserving a symmetry of its model-triples;
and so returns us to the contrast between the symmetries of a bare theory, and those of its
model-triples. The third returns us to the contrast between duality and gauge, discussed
in comment (4) at end of Section 2.1.
(1): Making the comparison precise:—
Earlier (at the end of Section 1.1) we announced that we would endorse a basic analogy
between duality and symmetry: ‘a duality is like a symmetry, but at the level of theory’,
so that while a symmetry carries e.g. a state into a ‘matching’ state, a duality carries a
theory into a ‘matching’ theory.
Indeed, we endorse this analogy—allowing of course for the shift of words from ‘theory’
to ‘model-triple’. This endorsement is clear from:
(a): our discussion of symmetries of theories, taken as triples, and symmetries of
their models, and their model-triples (Section 3.1.1); and
(b): our definition of duality as an isomorphism of model-triples that (i) makes the
39
values of quantities match, and (ii) is equivariant for the two triples’ dynamics (cf. Eq. 7
and Figure 7 at the end of Section 3.2.1).
In particular (as mentioned at the end of Section 3.2.1): a duality reduces to a symme-
try, in the case where there is just one model, and one model triple, at issue, i.e. M1 = M2
and m1 = m2. Spelling this out will use the notion of a dual map (in the pure mathemati-
cal sense!), introduced in (i) at the start of Section 3.1.1. Recall that this notion is defined
by the pairing whereby states s ∈ S and quantities Q ∈ Q assign each other a value 〈Q, s〉.
Namely: given any map a : S → S, we said that its dual map on quantities, a∗ : Q → Q
is defined by requiring that for any s ∈ S and Q ∈ Q: 〈a∗(Q), s〉 := 〈Q, a(s)〉. And
similarly, starting with quantities: given any map a : Q → Q, we said that its dual map
on states, a∗ : S → S is defined by requiring for all arguments: 〈Q, a∗(s)〉 := 〈a(Q), s〉.
Thus suppose there is just one model triple at issue. Then ds is an automorphism
of SM1 ≡ SM2 , i.e. of the state-space in the one model triple; and similarly, for dq on
QM1 ≡ QM2 . So duality’s condition (i), that the values of quantities match (Eq. (7)),
becomes the condition
〈Q1, s1〉1 = 〈dq(Q1), ds(s1)〉1 , ∀Q1 ∈ QM1 , s1 ∈ SM1 . (12)
But dq induces a dual map d
∗
q on states, such that: 〈dq(Q1), ds(s1)〉1 = 〈Q1, d∗q(ds(s1))〉1.
So we conclude that (d∗q ◦ ds) : SM1 → SM1 is a symmetry (written, as usual for us, as a
map on states rather than quantities). For we have:
〈Q1, s1〉1 = 〈dq(Q1), ds(s1)〉1 = 〈Q1, d∗q(ds(s1))〉1 . (13)
Finally, the same verdict—that for a single theory, duality reduces to symmetry—
applies to dynamics, i.e. to dynamical symmetries. That is: if a duality concerns just
one model triple, then Section 3.2.1’s condition (ii) for duality—that the duality map is
equivariant for the two triples’ dynamics (i.e. ds is equivariant for Schro¨dinger dynamics,
and dq is equivariant for Heisenberg dynamics)—reduces to the condition that the duality
is also a dynamical symmetry: for example, that ds is a dynamical symmetry represented
as a map on states.
(2): On duality preserving a symmetry:—
It is straightforward to confirm that on Section 3.2.1’s definition of duality, a duality
preserves any symmetry of its model triples. There are two points here. First: there is a
commuting square diagram of isomorphisms. Second: there is the issue of the values of a
quantity being equal on a given state, and on its transform under a symmetry. The first
point will lead in to the second.
First: The duality maps ds, dq are not only bijections, but isomorphisms: ds : SM1 →
SM2 , and dq : QM1 → QM2 . And although we did not have to spell out the exact structures
of SMi ,QMi that these isomorphisms are to preserve (but cf. footnote 23), it is obvious
from the fact that ‘is isomorphic to’ is both a symmetric and a transitive relation, that
the following diagram, with a understood to be any automorphism of SM1 , commutes
(cf. Figure 10).
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SM1 a−−→ SM1yds yds
SM2 −−→ SM2
Figure 10: Commutativity of duality and symmetry for states.
QM1 a−−→ QM1ydq ydq
QM2 −−→ QM2
Figure 11: Commutativity of duality and symmetry for quantities.
And of course, this diagram of isomorphisms is just what we mean by saying a duality
d preserves an automorphism of the state-space SM1 in its domain model triple, and
preserves SM1 ’s structure. Namely, d carries the automorphism—a map a on SM1—to a
corresponding automorphism of states in the codomain (indeed: range) model triple. The
diagram defines this corresponding automorphism, i.e. the map forming the fourth side
of the square: ds ◦ a ◦ (ds)−1 : SM2 → SM2 .
There is obviously a corresponding point about quantities, as against states. Since
dq is required to be an isomorphism of quantities, the following diagram, with a now
understood to be any automorphism of QM1 , must commute, cf. Figure 11.
And again, this diagram is just what we mean by saying a duality d preserves an au-
tomorphism of the quantities in its domain model triple, and preserves QM1 ’s structure.
Namely, d carries the automorphism—a map a on QM1—to a corresponding automor-
phism of quantities in the codomain (indeed: range) model triple. The diagram defines
this corresponding automorphism: dq ◦ a ◦ (dq)−1 : QM2 → QM2 .
Second: But in physics, the notion of symmetry involves more than the notions of
automorphism of the state-space, and of the set (usually algebra) of quantities. It involves
the pairing whereby states s and quantities Q assign each other a value: 〈Q, s〉. For these
values (for a large and salient set of quantities, though usually not all quantities) must
be preserved under the symmetry.
But satisfying this is automatic, for a duality as defined at the end of Section 3.2.1.
That is: For a duality to respect this aspect of symmetry was already built in to our
definition of duality: namely in condition (i), that the values are equal between states
and quantities that correspond by the duality. Recall Eq. (7)), which we here repeat:
〈Q1, s1〉1 = 〈dq(Q1), ds(s1)〉2 , ∀Q1 ∈ QM1 , s1 ∈ SM1 . (14)
Finally (and just like at the end of (1) above): the same verdict—that a duality
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SM1 a−−→ SM1yDt,t0 yDt,t0
SM1 a−−→ SM1
Figure 12: Commutativity of symmetry and dynamics.
SM2 −→ SM2yd−1s yd−1s
SM1 a−−→ SM1yDt,t0 yDt,t0
SM1 a−−→ SM1yds yds
SM2 −→ SM2
Figure 13: Commutativity of duality, symmetry, and dynamics.
preserves any symmetry of its model triples—applies to dynamics, i.e. to dynamical sym-
metries. Recall from footnote 20 (in Section 3.1.1) that a dynamical symmetry is a
commutation i.e. equivariance condition. So for the Schro¨dinger picture of dynamics,
the diagram for the ‘first’ side of a duality, i.e. m1 = 〈SM1 ,QM1 ,DM1〉, is, with a the
dynamical symmetry, as in Figure 12.
So we now compose this diagram with Figure 10, which represents that a duality
preserves a symmetry. But since in Figure 12, the ‘first’ side, ‘1’, of the duality occurs
twice, on both top and bottom rows, we now need to compose Figure 12 with Figure 10
twice: both on its bottom row; and also on its top row (with the duality arrow in Figure
10 reversed). The resulting diagram (Figure 13) shows that the duality isomorphism
on state-spaces ds carries the dynamical symmetry a on the ‘1’ side of the duality, to a
dynamical symmetry on the ‘2’ side: namely, the symmetry ds ◦ a ◦ d−1s (cf. either the
top or bottom square). The Schro¨dinger picture dynamics on SM2 is (reading down the
columns in the Figure): ds ◦Dt,t0 ◦ d−1s .
So much by way of showing that a duality always preserves a symmetry of its model
triples. In conclusion, we should emphasise again the three summarising comments, (i)
to (iii), at the end of Section 3.1.1 about the contrasts between the symmetries of a bare
theory, and those of its models, and of its model-triples.
(3): The contrast between duality and gauge:—
Finally, we should briefly return to our comment (4) at the end of Section 2.1. We said
there that, although there is some truth in the common remark that two dual theories
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are like gauge formulations of a single theory, there are two important differences. Some-
times the two duals are agreed to not be physically equivalent (as in Kramers-Wannier
duality). And anyway, the specific structure in a model is usually not gauge, in the sense
of descriptively redundant.
Our discussion since Section 2.1 reinforces this comment. For we have seen in more
detail the idea of specific structure in a model—-starting with our notation, M¯ , from Sec-
tion 2.2.3. And by relating duality as isomorphism of model triples to our interpretation
maps, we saw that duality allows, but does not entail, physical equivalence (cf. Section
3.2.3).
Besides, we have also seen a more specific contrast between duality and gauge, that
was not foreshadowed in comment (4) at the end of Section 2.1. Namely, we noted in (2) at
the end of Section 3.1.1 that if a symmetry of a model’s specific structure—a symmetry
of M¯—is well-defined on the model triple, we expect it to be trivial, i.e. the identity
map, there. This point implies that we would in general expect gauge (i.e. descriptively
redundant) structure to not be carried across intact by a duality. And indeed: this has
been illustrated in detail in gauge-gravity dualities. De Haro (2017a) has shown that a
certain subgroup of the diffeomorphism group of the gravity model of the theory (roughly,
the diffeomorphisms which preserve the asymptotic boundary conditions) is ‘invisible’ to
the gauge model of the theory, in the sense of not representing any difference on that
model, and so being trivially represented on the theory (the common core). Similarly
for the ‘gauge symmetries’ of the gauge side of the duality. These are not visible on the
gravity side: they are symmetries of the specific structure of the gauge model, and are
trivially represented on the theory (the common core); De Haro (2016a: Section 2.2.3),
De Haro et al. (2017: Section 5.2).
4 The Basic Boson-Fermion Duality
Boson-fermion duality will be our main example of the schema developed in Sections 2
and 3: for, as we discussed in Section 1.2, it lies in the middle of the spectrum between
(i) mathematical precision and established physics, (ii) scientific importance.
Boson-fermion duality is a vast field, still an active area of research today, especially
in its three- and four-dimensional versions.31 But even just in two dimensions, there is
a large number of examples, which we will discuss in the next Section. In this Section,
we will start with the basic case: that is, the equivalence between the free, massless
scalar field, and the free, massless Dirac fermion, in two Euclidean dimensions.32 This
case already exhibits all of the interesting and non-trivial features of the more involved
dualities, and so we will analyse it in some detail.
Our exposition will be necessarily brief, and will focus on those aspects that best
illustrate the schema. Thus we will downplay many other important physical and math-
ematical aspects of this duality, such as: the existence of classical and quantum soliton
solutions in these theories, the integrability of the equations, the notions of Noether and
31Cf. e.g. Gogolin (2004), Kopietz (2008), Kouneiher (2018).
32The results in Minkowski signature are readily obtained by a Wick rotation, as we discuss in Section
4.1.
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topological charges, the connection with QCD and monopoles. Neglecting these important
topics is the price we pay for focussing on illustrating a conceptual schema.
This Section is introductory. We here collect the technical results (especially, about
the symmetries, their associated Noether currents, and the algebras the currents generate)
that will allow us to illustrate our schema. Section 4.1 introduces the free, massless boson.
Section 4.2 introduces the free, massless Dirac fermion. (In Section 5, we will present the
basic boson-fermion duality, and show how it exemplifies our duality schema from Sections
2 and 3.)
Our exposition will mainly follow Ginsparg (1990) and Frishman and Sonnenschein (2010).
4.1 The free, massless boson
In this subsection, we study the free, massless boson. We analyse its symmetries, write
down the associated Noether currents, and give relevant details about its quantization, in
particular we give the algebra that the Noether currents satisfy. This algebra will be the
starting point of the comparison, in Section 5, with the fermionic model (where we will
also justify how the bosonic and fermionic models are ‘models’, in our sense of Sections
2.2.2 and 2.2.3).
In two-dimensional quantum field theory, it is very useful to work in complex coordi-
nates. We will use the coordinates z = x0 + ix1, z¯ = x0 − ix1 parametrising C ∼= R2, the
complex and Euclidean planes, respectively.
We first discuss the classical field and its symmetries, in two points, (i)-(ii), below.
A free, massless scalar field Φ satisfies the massless Klein-Gordon equation, which in the
complex coordinates chosen in the previous paragraph takes the form: ∂∂¯Φ = 0 (here,
and elsewhere, we use the short-hand ∂ = ∂/∂z, ∂¯ = ∂/∂z¯). The general solution to
this equation allows for much more general functions than it does in higher dimensions,
and this is the root of the richness of two-dimensional quantum field theory. The general
solution is the sum of a holomorphic and an anti-holomorphic function:33
Φ(z, z¯) = φ(z) + φ¯(z¯) . (15)
The holomorphic and anti-holomorphic functions φ(z) and φ¯(z¯) are often called the left-,
respectively right-moving parts of Φ. This is because a holomorphic function depends
only on z = x0 + ix1: and after Wick rotation x1 → −ix (with x0 = t), the holomorphic
part of Φ induces a function of t+x. For any fixed value of t+x, this indeed gives motion
to the left (the speed is always negative at fixed t+ x); whereas z¯ → t− x, and thus f¯(z¯)
induces a function of t − x, which is right-moving (the speed is always positive at any
fixed t+ x).
The equations of motion (equivalently, the classical action) have two sets of symmetries
which will be the starting point of our set-up (once they are generalised to symmetries of
33Classically, we may indeed require the solutions to be holomorphic and anti-holomorphic functions.
Quantum mechanically, there are singularities which are both inevitable and the source of interesting
physics, as we will see. Thus we will allow φ(z) and φ¯(z¯) to have isolated singularities, hence we will
allow them to be meromorphic and anti-meromorphic functions (operators, in the quantum version of
the model), respectively.
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the quantum version of the model):
(i) Conformal transformations. In two dimensions, the action of a massless scalar field
is invariant under a large group of coordinate transformations, namely conformal trans-
formations: these are scale transformations with a variable scale factor, such that angles
are preserved. In complex variables z, z¯, the conformal transformations are parametrised
by arbitrary holomorphic and anti-holomorphic functions:
z → z′ = f(z) , z¯ → z¯′ = f¯(z¯) . (16)
This is the two-dimensional version of the conformal transformations. Unlike the confor-
mal group in higher dimensions, which has an finite number of generators (the generators
of the Poincare´ group plus additional generators of conformal transformations), the above
transformations form an group whose corresponding algebra has an infinite number of gen-
erators. After taking into account quantum effects, this will be the celebrated Virasoro
algebra.
It is easy to see that the above transformations contain, in terms of the Euclidean co-
ordinates xµ = (x0, x1), in particular: (a) constant translations, xµ → xµ + aµ, (b) SO(2)
rotations (in Minkowski signature, these are SO(1, 1) Lorentz transformations), which in
complex coordinates induce a U(1) action, (c) dilations (scale transformations) z′ = λ z,
z¯′ = λ¯ z¯ (λ ∈ R).
(ii) Affine current algebra transformations. These are translations of the field by
holomorphic or anti-holomorphic functions,
Φ(z, z¯) → Φ(z, z¯) + ϕ(z) , Φ(z, z¯)→ Φ(z, z¯) + ϕ¯(z¯) . (17)
Again, these transformations generalise the invariance of the action under constant shifts
Φ→ Φ + ϕ0, and are specific to two dimensions.
The conserved currents associated with these two sets of symmetries are obtained
through the Noether procedure. The currents for the affine current algebra transforma-
tions (17) are, up to an overall constant:
J(z) := ∂φ(z) , J¯(z¯) := ∂¯φ¯(z¯) , (18)
and they are anti-holomorphically, respectively holomorphically conserved in virtue of
their (anti-) holomorphicity. These currents are called ‘affine currents’ because, in the
quantum version of the model, they generate an affine Lie algebra or Kac-Moody algebra.
The conserved currents associated with the conformal transformations (16) are the
(holomorphic and anti-holomorphic) components of the stress-energy tensor:
T (z) = −1
2
∂φ ∂φ = −1
2
J2(z) , T¯ (z¯) = −1
2
∂¯φ ∂¯φ¯ = −1
2
J¯2(z¯) . (19)
The fact that the components of the stress-energy tensor can be written as squares of the
affine algebra currents will be important upon quantisation, since it will link together the
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Virasoro and the Kac-Moody algebras. In the quantum case, the right-hand side of (19)
will contain the normally ordered product, and the relation is then called the Sugawara
construction.
Our next task is to quantise the model. There are two well-known ways to quantise
this model (which we briefly discuss in what follows), but we will settle for a third one,
which is the more ‘modern approach’, called ‘radial quantisation’. It is well suited to our
perspective because it exploits the conformal symmetry group, and delivers the conformal
algebra in the way we want it for Section 5.
One can adopt conventional canonical quantization, where one writes down canonical
commutation relations for the fields and their canonically conjugate momenta. One can
realize these commutation relations by choosing a Fock-space representation of the fields,
and writing down the algebra of the creation and annihilation operators, which (in the
present case of two dimensions) depend on one-dimensional momenta. One can then write
down a Hamiltonian in terms of the creation and annihilation operators, and set up the
physical states in the Fock space. See e.g. Frishman and Sonnenschein (2010: Section 1.6).
The model can also be readily quantised using path integral quantisation. See e.g. Fr-
ishman and Sonnenschein (2010: Section 1.9). Here, we will adopt the third method,
radial quantisation, as follows (ibid. Section 1.7).
This approach is based on the complex coordinates z, z¯. First, we will use the confor-
mal symmetry group to choose more convenient coordinates: mapping ξ := x0 + ix1 7→
z := eξ = ex
0+ix1 (for more details, see the Appendix). ‘Radial’ then refers to the fact
that, after this conformal transformation, the equal-time slices x0 = constant, used for
canonical quantisation, become circles of constant radius. The line integrals over space
which appear in physical quantities, such as charges, then turn into contour integrals on
the complex plane. We will not spell out the details of this procedure, of which there are
many good reviews (see e.g. Section 2.2 of Ginsparg (1990) or Lu¨st et al. (1989: Section
4.1)), but the key technique we will mention is the use of radial ordering to define the
order of operators which are integrated over a contour in the complex plane.
Remember that our aim for the quantum model of the boson is to obtain its algebra
of operators. To this end, we will use the short-distance behaviour of a distinguished set
of fields (so-called ‘primary fields’: cf. next paragraph). The algebra is indeed encoded
in the short-distance behaviour of the products of the primary fields among each other
and with the stress-energy tensor. This short-distance behaviour of products is called the
‘operator product expansion’. To this we now turn.
So let us consider a primary field Ψ(z, z¯). Primary fields are defined by their transfor-
mation properties under conformal transformations (see Eq. (40) in the Appendix).34 It
can be readily shown that the short-distance behaviour of the product of the stress-energy
34They are called ‘primary’ because all other fields, which are called ‘descendants’, can be obtained
from them, through successive application of derivatives. See De Haro et al. (2016: Section 3).
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tensor with any primary field is:
T (z) Ψ(w, w¯) =
h
(z − w)2 Ψ(w, w¯) +
1
z − w ∂wΨ(w, w¯) + finite terms, (z → w)(20)
T¯ (z¯) Ψ(w, w¯) =
h¯
(z¯ − w¯)2 Ψ(w, w¯) +
1
z¯ − w¯ ∂w¯Ψ(w, w¯) + finite terms, (z¯ → w¯)
where h, h¯ are the conformal weights of the primary field Ψ, i.e. the powers with which
a field scales under meromorphic, respectively anti-meromorphic transformations (16), as
in Eq. (40) of the Appendix.35 The conformal weights are usually denoted as (h, h¯), and
they encode how a field transforms under dilatations.36 For example, taking Ψ = ∂φ(w),
i.e. the (derivative of the) massless left-moving part of φ, we have h = 1, since this field
is a vector, hence the conformal weight is (1, 0). Obviously, this is our primary field of
interest in this model. As we will see below, after Eq. (22), the stress-energy tensor is not
a primary field. On the other hand (cf. Section 4.2), a Weyl-Majorana fermion Ψ = χ(w)
has conformal weight (1
2
, 0). The anti-holomorphic bosonic field φ¯ has conformal weight
(0, 1); and the anti-holomorphic Weyl-Majorana fermion has (0, 1
2
).
The expansion (20) is called an operator product expansion. Operator product expan-
sions are important because they tell us almost everything we need to know about a field:
in particular, we will derive from them the algebra of operators of the model. The form
of (20) is a direct consequence of the quantum nature of the operators, together with the
assumption of Ψ’s being a primary field, i.e. that it satisfies (40). It can be shown that
the operator product expansion is equivalent to the canonical commutation relations of
the modes of the fields. Eq. (20) thus encodes the short-distance behaviour of Ψ, and is
often taken to be an alternative definition of a primary field Ψ.
In the classical model, the stress-energy tensor was given, in Eq. (19), by the squares
of operators evaluated at the same point. In the quantum version of the model, this gives
rise to divergences which need to be (and can be) renormalised. For the two-dimensional
quantum field theories which we consider in this paper, the divergences are renormalised,
to all orders, by the addition of a single counterterm to the action; alternatively, it suffices
to define expressions such as (19) by normal ordering:
T (z) = −1
2
: J(z) J(z) : , T¯ (z¯) = −1
2
: J¯(z¯) J¯(z¯) : , (21)
where the affine currents are still given, in the free bosonic scalar case, by (18), now as
operator equations. The normal ordering is denoted by the colons. For the details of the
normal ordering procedure, see e.g. Ginsparg (1990: Section 2.3).
Similarly to (20), the operator product expansion of the stress-energy tensor with itself
can be worked out:
T (z)T (w) =
c/2
(z − w)4 +
2
(z − w)2 T (w) +
1
z − w ∂T (w) . (22)
35As remarked in footnote 33, in the quantum case we allow for (anti-) meromorphic, rather than
(anti-) holomorphic, operators.
36In more detail: h+ h¯ is the eigenvalue of the dilatation operator, and h− h¯ is the eigenvalue of the
(Euclidean) rotation operator. Hence, the conformal weights contain information about the mass and the
Euclidean spin of a field.
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Here, c = 1 for the free scalar (19), and it is called the central charge. Comparing the
second term with (20), we see that h = 2, i.e. the stress-energy tensor T is a conformal
field of weight (2, 0), as expected from dimensional analysis. However, compared to (20),
this expansion has, in addition, the first term. So T (z) is not a primary field in the sense
of Eq. (20), nor does it transform as in Eq. (40). The term proportional to the central
charge c = 1 is obtained making use of the normalized expression (21). For another way
to calculate the central charge, see Frishman and Sonnenschein (2010: Section 1.10).
In the same way, the operator product expansion of two affine currents (18), as well
as that between T and J , can be calculated, with the following result:
J(z) J(w) =
1
(z − w)2 + finite terms, (z → w)
T (z) J(w) =
1
(z − w)2 J(w) +
1
z − w ∂J(w) . (23)
The second equation between T and J is simply (20) applied to the special case h = 1,
owing to the fact that J = ∂φ is indeed a primary field of weight (1, 0).
Like in the canonical formalism, where a classical expansion of the field translates,
quantum mechanically, into Fock modes: also in radial quantization it is convenient to
introduce modes, which will give rise to creation and annihilation operators of the fields
upon quantisation. That this is possible is ensured by (15), which says that the field can
be decomposed into meromorphic and anti-meromorphic parts. In particular, we can do
a Laurent expansion of the meromorphic and anti-meromorphic parts of the field. Thus,























Overall factors of 1/z and 1/z2 can be extracted from J , respectively T : a fact which will
be useful because these currents have h = 1 and h = 2, respectively, and so J0 and L0, as
defined by (24), will have special physical significance. The summation range is infinite
and therefore this normalization can always be reached, by a simple translation of n.
Because the currents satisfy (18) and (21), it is clear that Jn are linear in the creation
and annihilation operators of the meromorphic field φ, and the Ln are quadratic in (an
infinite sum of) the Jn’s. This fact will be built into our considerations in what follows,
though we do not work it out explicitly.
Finally, we find the algebras satisfied by Jn and Ln. Again these can be found either
by canonical quantization or, in line with the methods we have used so far, they can be
obtained directly from the operator product expansions (23) and (22), combined with the
radial ordering prescription for the operators which contain circle integrals, mentioned
above. Writing δm+n as short for δ(m+n)0 (defined as usual to be 1 or 0 according as
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m+ n = 0 or m+ n 6= 0): the result is:
[Lm, Ln] = (m− n)Lm+n + c
12
n(n2 − 1) δm+n
[Jm, Jn] = −mδm+n
[Lm, Jn] = −nJm+n . (25)
and the same algebra is satisfied by the J¯n and L¯n. Barred and unbarred quantities com-
mute with each other. In the case at hand, c = 1.
We recognise the first line as the celebrated Virasoro algebra, as expected from the fact
that the classical theory has a conformal symmetry group. In the second line, one may
recognise the level k = 1, abelian Kac-Moody algebra. The third line is obtained from
the operator product expansion between T and J in (23), and it makes the total algebra
into the semi-direct product of the abelian Kac-Moody algebra and the Virasoro algebra.
The algebra (25) is called the enveloping Virasoro algebra (with c = 1 and k = 1). The
general enveloping algebra of the affine Lie algebra is given in (41) in the Appendix.37
This, i.e. Eq. (25), is the central result from the physics literature which we have been
seeking, and will use in Section 5. For, together with (21) and the mode expansions (24),
the tensor product of the holomorphic enveloping algebra of the affine Lie algebra (25)
and its anti-holomorphic copy contains all of the information about the quantum version
of the model. This is because the states now live in the vector space on which this algebra
acts (a Hilbert space), and the quantities and the dynamics are constructed from the
operators satisfying the algebra. We will show this in Section 5.
At this point, we notice that the generators L± and L0 span an SL(2,R) subalgebra.
Together with the generators L¯± and L¯0, which satisfy the same algebra, they form the
conformal algebra of SL(2,C), which is the symmetry group of the vacuum of this model.
4.2 The free, massless Dirac fermion
In this subsection, we consider our second model: of a free, massless Dirac fermion in two
dimensions. Our goal is to rederive the infinite-dimensional algebra (25) in this model.
We will follow similar steps as in Section 4.1: we will derive the classical symmetries,
quantise the model, and obtain operator product expansions. (The discussion of how this
accommodates to the sense of ‘model’, in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, is postponed to Section
5.2.)
The massless Dirac fermion is a two-component, complex spinor which can be de-
composed as Ψ =: (ψ, ψ˜), where ψ and ψ˜ are chiral (Weyl) fermions, called left- and











ψ† ∂¯ψ + ψ˜† ∂ψ˜
)
, (26)
37Notice that (25) satisfies the property that the level k can be changed by a rescaling of J . Thus, in
the simple case we are dealing with here, in which the affine Lie algebra is based on the commutative Lie
group U(1), the level has no real meaning. This is not important for us, since we will not use it: rather,
our analysis in Section 5 will be based on the fact that we are here dealing with a special case of the
general enveloping algebra of the affine Lie algebra.
49
where in the middle expression we used the real form of the action, and in the last
expression we used complex coordinates. The equations of motion imply that ψ and ψ˜
are, respectively, holomorphic and anti-holomorphic (respectively meromorphic, in the
quantum version of the model).
It is customary to further decompose the Dirac fermions into real, i.e. Majorana
fermions, as follows: Ψ = 1√
2
(Ψ1 + iΨ2). In terms of the chiral (Weyl) fermions, we
get ψ = 1√
2
(ψ1 + iψ2), where ψ1,2 are Weyl-Majorana fermions, and so the action takes
the form of the sum of two copies of a single Weyl-Majorana fermion, which is conven-







χ ∂¯χ+ χ˜ ∂χ˜
)
, (27)
and again χ, χ˜ are (if extended from the real line to the entire complex plane) meromorphic
and anti-meromorphic, respectively.
Like in the case of the free, massless boson studied in Section 4.1, this action is
invariant under two sets of symmetries:
(i) Conformal transformations: z → f(z), z¯ → f¯(z¯), the same transformations on
the complex plane that we found in the bosonic model, Section 4.1.
(ii) Left-holomorphic-chiral and right-anti-holomorphic-chiral transformations:
which act on the Weyl-Majorana fermions as follows:
ψ → ψ′ = ei α(z) ψ
ψ˜ → ψ˜′ = ei α˜(z¯) ψ˜ . (28)
Quantisation now proceeds similarly to what we did for the free, massless boson. One
can do canonical quantisation (see Frishman and Sonnenschein (2010: Section 2.12)) or
again use circle integration and radial ordering to calculate operator product expansions,
and get from them the commutation relations for the generators.
First, let us notice that the definition of primary fields, Eq. (40) in the Appendix,
applies equally well to fermions as it does to bosons. Also, the stress-energy tensor for
fermions can be introduced, analogously to Eq. (19) (as we do below).
The Weyl-Majorana fermion is a primary field, as one finds from its operator product
expansion with the stress-energy tensor (20). Like before, we have conserved currents
(i.e. annihilated by ∂¯ for the meromorphic, and by ∂ for the anti-meromorphic current)
associated with the sets of symmetries (i) and (ii) above:
J(z) = : ψ†ψ : , J¯ =: ψ˜† ψ˜ :
T (z) = −1
2




ψ† ∂ψ − ∂ψ† ψ) : , (29)
with a similar expression for T¯ in terms of ψ˜. χ has conformal dimension (1
2
, 0), and χ˜ has
conformal dimension (0, 1
2
). The central charge (22) is c = 1
2
(and so, a Dirac fermion,
which is the sum of two Majorana-Weyl fermions, has twice this amount, i.e. c = 1).
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Notice that despite the half-integral values of the conformal dimensions, the currents
J(z), J¯(z¯) in (29) actually have the same conformal dimensions as the currents (21) in
the bosonic model. This is because they are now quadratic in the fermions.
As it turns out, the operator product expansion of J with itself is identical to that
in (23). Consequently, because T in (29) satisfies the Sugawara construction (cf. after
Eq. (19)), the product expansions of T with itself and of T and J are also identical to
those in (22) and in (23). Now since also here, J and T are meromorphic operators, we
can expand them in coefficients Jn and Ln, as in (24). The resulting algebra is thus the
very same as in the bosonic case, (25), i.e. the semi-direct product of the Virasoro algebra
with c = 1 with the abelian affine algebra at level k = 1 (and its anti-meromorphic copy)!
Therefore, also the state-space will be the same, since it is constructed as the Hilbert
space on which the algebra acts.
The implication of this basic fact—the agreement of the two models on their algebra
of currents—will be explored in the next Section. We will see that it naturally leads to
the existence of a duality, and thus to the formulation of a theory comprising the two
models.
5 Boson-Fermion Duality Illustrates the Schema
In this Section, we show how Section 4’s bosonic and fermionic models (models in our
sense!) illustrate the schema set out in Sections 2 and 3, leading up to the definition
of duality in Section 3.2. In Section 5.1, we state the basic ‘dictionary’ of the duality,
mapping fields, currents and stress-energy tensors. Then Section 5.2 builds on this, to
show that the two models are isomorphic, in exactly the sense of our schema: i.e. as
regards the whole trio of states, quantities and dynamics. Then in Section 5.3, we return
to Section 2.4’s theme: of defining a theory by abstraction from its models. We first
note some special features of our case-study, in particular that it has just two isomorphic
models; and then we define a theory, a common core, from the two models. In Section
5.4, we discuss other ways one might define a theory from these models, i.e. so as to have
them be representations of it. Finally, we briefly discuss generalizations of our case-study:
to include massive particles, and to include non-abelian degrees of freedom (Section 5.5).
5.1 The duality dictionary
In Section 4, we derived the algebraic structures of the bosonic and the fermionic models.
In particular, we saw that both models satisfy the enveloping algebra of the affine algebra
(Eq. (25) and Eq. (41) in the Appendix) with c = 1 and k = 1, for the quantum currents
corresponding to the Noether symmetries.
At this point, Frishman and Sonnenschein (2010: Section 6.1) conclude that the two
theories are equivalent. They write:
‘Due to the uniqueness of the irreducible unitary k = 1 representation of the affine Lie
algebras, and the fact that the infinite-dimensional algebraic structure fully determines
the theories, we conclude that in two space-time dimensions the theories of massless free
scalar field and Dirac field are equivalent. The equivalence implies that every operator
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of one model should have a partner in the other model, in such a way that the operator
product expansions of these operators should be identical.’ (p. 133: Italics in the original).
While we basically agree with this statement, one of its clauses—that the infinite-
dimensional algebraic structure fully determines the theories (in our jargon form Section
2.2: the models)—has not been proven, and requires some explanation and justification.
Doing that is our plan for this subsection and the next. In this subsection, we give the
basic dictionary that Frishman and Sonnenschein refer to in the quoted passage. (Then in
Section 5.2.1-5.2.3, we will argue that this infinite-dimensional algebraic structure indeed
is sufficient to fully specify what we have called a model.)
The duality dictionary is given by the correspondence of the bosonic affine current
algebra currents with the corresponding fermionic currents, and between the stress-energy
tensors, as follows (cf. Frishman and Sonnenschein (2010: Section 6.1))38:
JB(z) = ∂φ(z) ↔ JF(z) = : ψ†(z)ψ(z) : (30)
TB(z) = −1
2




ψ†(z) ∂ψ(z)− ∂ψ†(z)ψ(z)) : ,
and similarly for the anti-meromorphic currents. We have already seen that both sides
satisfy the same operator product expansion, and therefore they satisfy the same algebra.
Notice that only fermion bilinears appear in (30). This is what we expect, since a
single boson (h = 1) should correspond to a pair of fermions (h = 1
2
and h¯ = 1
2
). But
it is not a priori clear which bosonic field a single fermion should correspond to. One
would here expect to take some kind of ‘square root’ of the boson. But, surprisingly, the
dictionary turns out to extend to a single fermion field as follows:
: ei φ(z) : ↔ ψ(z) , : e−iφ(z) : ↔ ψ†(z)
: e−iφ¯(z¯) : ↔ ψ˜(z¯) , : ei φ¯(z¯) : ↔ ψ˜†(z¯) , (31)
and again the operator product expansions agree. At first, this is a very surprising
result, reminiscent of the construction of a coherent state. However, the operator product
expansion shows that the conformal dimension of : eiα φ(z) : is h = α2/2, so the above
dictionary indeed reproduces h = 1
2
and h¯ = 1
2
for the left- and right-chiral Dirac fermions,
respectively. This is indeed a purely quantum result, with no straightforward classical
analogue.
One of the most surprising features of (31) is that φ satisfies canonical commutation
relations, while ψ satisfies canonical anti-commutation relations. How can this be? To
calculate the anticommutator of two ψ’s, one uses the formula eAeB = e[A,B] eBeA, which
holds when [A,B] is a c-number. Using this formula to evaluate the commutator of
two exponentials, and using the canonical commutation relations for the boson and its
conjugate canonical momentum, one finds that, indeed, the left- and right-chiral fermions
anti-commute!
38The dictionary thus relates (18) and (21) to (29). We here add the subscripts ‘B’ and ‘F’ for ‘bosonic’
and ‘fermionic’, respectively.
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5.2 Two isomorphic model triples
In Section 5.1, we gave the ‘dictionary’ between the bosonic and fermionic models. This is
a bijection between the basic operators of the theory (the fields). But there is, of course,
more to duality than this. We need to show that the two models are isomorphic, as triples.
Recall our second sense of ‘model’, in Section 2.2.2: as a representation of a theory. So a
model is a triple (what we called the ‘model triple’), together with some specific structure.
And the model triple was not a ‘pure copy’ of the theory, but a representation of it using
the specific structure. The next three subsections deal with the triples of states, quantities,
and dynamics. In each of the subsections we show the existence of an isomorphism between
the states, quantities, and dyamics of the two models (in the third case, an equivariance
relation). This will justify that the boson-fermion equivalence is indeed a duality, in the
sense of our schema. The final subsection considers the interpretation of this duality.
5.2.1 States
We begin by showing that the state spaces of the two models are isomorphic. This will
form the first item in our model triple. The state spaces of the bosonic and the fermionic
models were introduced at the ends of Sections 4.1 and 4.2, as the Hilbert spaces obtained
from the representations of the enveloping algebra of the affine Lie algebra (25) (which,
for short, we shall also call the ‘enveloping algebra’). We give some more details here.
The enveloping algebra is realized in the bosonic and the fermionic cases in terms of
different fields: the bosonic J-currents (18) and the fermionic J-currents (29) are defined
in terms of different fields. Consequently, also the stress-energy tensors, given in the
two cases by the Sugawara construction, differ, and so do the mode operators Jn and Ln
which enter the enveloping algebra of the affine Lie algebra. In other words, we have two
representations of the same algebra. Let us call these AB for the bosonic representation
and AF for the bosonic representation.
The state spaces are, as mentioned in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, the Hilbert spaces obtained
from the representations of the enveloping algebra, Eq. (25): or, better, its generalisation,
Eq. (41) in the Appendix, to general underlying Lie group and general value of k. The
vacuum state is obtained by requiring Jan |0〉 = 0, for n ≥ 0, where a labels the generators
of the Lie algebra. Here, the generators Jan are the ladder operators of the algbera. This
condition can also be understood physically as the regularity condition J(z) |0〉 = 0 at
z = 0 for the affine currents.
The non-trivial representations are constructed from the irreducible representations of
the algebra, which are uniquely characterised by the highest-weight states (analogous to
states of maximal J for SU(2)), obtained by application of a primary field (cf. Eqs. (20)
and (40)) to the vacuum. If we denote such a state by |l, l¯〉, where l, l¯ are the represen-
tations, the remaining states in the representation (so-called ‘descendants’) are obtained
by appropriately applying generators, and take the generic form:
L−m1 · · ·L−mM L¯−m¯1 · · · L¯−m¯M¯ Ja1−n1 · · · JaN−nN J¯a1−n¯1 · · · J¯ a¯N¯−n¯N¯ |l, l¯〉, for some integersM, M¯,N, N¯ .






, the ψ−n operators are creation operators, and the ψn are annihilation op-
39Here, ν = 12 for periodic boundary conditions, and ν = 0 for anti-periodic.
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erators. The fermionic vacuum is defined as ψn |0〉 = 0 (n > 0), and the states in the
Hilbert space are of the type ψ−n1 · · ·ψ−nk |0〉.
We will use the fact that the irreducible unitary representations of the enveloping
algebra, thus constructed, are unique up to unitary equivalence. (See e.g. Frishman and
Sonnenschein (2010, p. 133).40
So, for each of the models, we construct a representation of the algebra on a Hilbert
space, HB for the bosons and HF for the fermions; and these representations are unitarily
equivalent. Let us denote the unitary operator in question U .
5.2.2 Quantities
Next, we show that also the quantities of the two models are isomorphic, thus providing
the second item of the model triple. What are the relevant physical quantities? We
already mentioned in Section 3.2.1 that we take the physical quantities to be all the
renormalizable, self-adjoint operators constructed from a more basic set of quantities
(which in a moment we will identify with the currents) and respecting the appropriate
symmetries.
Let us look again at the two representations, AB and AF, of the enveloping algebra
of the affine Lie algebra, which we discussed in Section 5.2.1. We can say more about
these representations: for we already have the ‘dictionary’, Eq. (30)-(31), between the
fields. At this point we know that this dictionary is a bijection, but we wish to find a
condition for it to be an isomorphism. First: notice that this bijection induces a similar
bijection between the respective mode operators, i.e. it induces a bijective map between
the algebras, d : AB → AF: (d for ‘duality’)
d(Jn,B) = Jn,F
d(Ln,B) = Ln,F . (32)
This is of course just the statement that we have two equivalent representations of the
enveloping algebra.
From the previous section, we know that the representation spaces HB and HF of these
algebras are constructed from the irreducible representations of highest weight, which are
unique up to unitary equivalence. Since the construction of the representations of the
states is the same for the two models (i.e. in terms of the algebra generators mapped by
Eq. (32)), the algebra generators themselves must be compatible with the bijection which
maps the highest weight representations on the two sides. So, for consistency we must
require:
d(· · · ) = U † (· · · ) U , (33)
where U is the same map used to map the states of the highest-weight representations in
the previous subsection. If the maps U and d were not related a la (33), the structure
of the theory would not be preserved by the duality (since an operator acting on a state
would not be mapped to the the corresponding operator acting on the corresponding
40For more details, see Di Francesco et al. (1997: Chapter 14) or Kac (1990).
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state). In short: once we have fixed the states to be mapped by U , as in Section 5.2.1,
then the same transformation must map the quantities, as in (33).
But Eq. (33) is precisely the condition for the map to be an isomorphism, in addition
to a bijection. And it now follows from the above that the modes of the currents of the
two models are mapped as:
U † Jn,B U = Jn,F
U † Ln,B U = Ln,F . (34)
It also follows that the same relations hold for the currents (30) themselves:
U † JB(z) U = JF(z)
U † TB(z) U = TF(z) . (35)
The same map also maps the fermionic operators:
U † : ei φ(z) : U = ψ(z) , U † : e−i φ(z) : U = ψ†(z)
U † : e−i φ¯(z¯) : U = ψ˜(z¯) , U † : ei φ¯(z¯) : U = ψ˜†(z¯) . (36)
This is the formalization of (31), which was justified by checking its properties (including
the correct statistics, but also all the correct correlation functions). Given (31), the factors
of U follow from the fact that ψ(z) creates or annihilates a fermionic state in HF, and
this state is obtained from the corresponding bosonic state in HB using the same map U .
The operator creating or annihilating this state must therefore transform bilinearly in U .
One can also check that the map between the affine currents, the first equation in (34),
follows from (36).
We have discussed the maps between the operators of the enveloping algebra of the
affine Lie algebra, and the corresponding fields. We now discuss the physical quantities,
QB and QF, of self-adjoint operators respecting the relevant symmetries. In the fermionic
model, all the self-adjoint operators are quadratic in the fermions: and taking into account
the chiral symmetry algebra, they must necessarily be powers of the fermionic currents
(35) (and their anti-chiral counterparts), appropriately normally-ordered. In fact, arbi-
trary analytic functionals of the currents are allowed. There can be a mixing between the
meromorphic and anti-meromorphic sectors in the analytic functionals, but only such that
the chiral symmetry algebra is preserved. Thus, the enveloping algebra indeed contains
all of the information about the physical quantities: QF consists of arbitrary analytic
functionals in the fermionic currents (35) (and their anti-meromorphic counterparts),
appropriately normally-ordered. The normal ordering automatically ensures that these
correlation functions are well-defined.
One can in principle enlarge the setQF to also contain the correlation functions of oper-
ators which violate the chiral symmetry algebra, evaluated on the same states, i.e. without
changing the Lagrangian of the model. However, one is then changing the symmetries
of the model triple f = 〈HF,QF,DF〉, and hence one is defining a new model triple (and,
consequently, if there is a duality for this larger class of models, one is defining a new
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theory). We will return to this possibility when we discuss sine-Gordon/massive Thirring
duality in Section 5.5.1.
In the bosonic model, there is a similar structure. Now it is not the mixing of chiralities
of the fields which the symmetries forbid, but the appearance of the underived field φ(z)
in QB. Namely, the translation symmetry Φ → Φ + a (or, more generally, the affine
current symmetry algebra (17)), forbids the appearance of operators which depend on
φ(z) or φ¯(z¯) directly, i.e. as opposed to depending on them through their derivatives.
When the model is written in terms of the meromorphic and anti-meromorphic parts of
Φ, translation symmetry is preserved iff all operators depend on the derivatives of the
scalar field. This is precisely how the scalar field appears in the currents (35). Thus, once
again, the affine current symmetry algebra of the model tells us that all the operators
which are physical quantities of QB, must be analytic functions of the two currents (and
their anti-meromorphic counterparts). QB consists of all possible analytic functionals of
those currents. As for the renormalizability constraint on the physical quantities: as
we mentioned before, normal ordering automatically takes care of getting the correct
renormalized quantities.
To end this subsection, let us get a possible worry out of the way. Namely, one might
be concerned that (36) seems to be introducing complex operators, such as : ei φ(z) : , into
the set of physical quantities of the bosonic model, which is supposed to be entirely real.
But this is not quite right. For (36) are in fact not physical operators, on our conception of
the term. It is indeed true that : ei φ(z) : is not self-adjoint in the bosonic model, but then
neither is ψ(z) self-adjoint in the fermionic model. Neither of these two operators are thus
to be taken as physical on either of the two sides, even if we can build physical operators,
such as the currents (30), by taking powers of them. Thus, none of the operators in
(36) belong to either QB or QF. Rather we should think of such operators as states in the
Hilbert space, using the state-operator correspondence. Indeed, recall, from Section 5.2.1,
that the states in the fermionic Hilbert space are of the type: ψ−n1 · · ·ψ−nk |0〉. So this
explains how ψ(z) can be a physical operator—namely, it creates and annihilates physical
states in HF—while it is not self-adjoint and does not belong to the set QF of physical
quantities.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the above is the fact that, in two dimensions,
the Hilbert space of the bosonic model contains fermionic states, e.g. states with conformal
weight (1
2
, 0). In fact, because the conformal weight of the operator : ei α φ(z) : is h = α2/2,
the Hilbert space contains a 1-parameter family of states with a continuous range of
Euclidean spin values.41 This feature of the quantised models is indeed surprising—and
illustrates our theme of surprise announced in (2) of Section 2.1.
5.2.3 Dynamics
Finally, we discuss the equivariance of the dynamics of the two model triples. ‘Dynamics’
can be understood in different ways in different theories, and even in one formulation of
41Our use of the word ‘Euclidean spin’ here follows the jargon in the physics literature, for the eigenvalue
under Euclidean rotations, as we mentioned in Section 4.1. It is questionable whether such jargon is
justified by the physical interpretation in 1+1 dimensions. But we will not need to dwell on this point,
since our main aim in this Section is formal.
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a single theory. Think, for example, of the difference in the dynamics if it is formulated
in the Heisenberg or in the Schro¨dinger pictures of a theory.
First of all, we have formulated our model triples in the Heisenberg picture: opera-
tors are generally time-dependent and the states are time-independent. Let us consider
the bosonic model first. We are working in Euclidean spacetime, but when analytically
continued to Minkowski spacetime the operator HB := L0,B + L¯0,B (which generates di-
latations on the plane) is the generator of time translations, and is to be identified with
the Hamiltonian. It is indeed the 00-component of the stress-energy tensor. The same is
true in the fermionic model: the 00-component of the stress-energy tensor, which is the
generator of time translations, is the operator HF := L0,F + L¯0,F. These two Hamiltonians
are mapped to each other by the map U in (34) (and the anti-meromorphic version of that
equation). Thus the dynamics is correctly preserved by the duality map: more precisely,
it is equivariant with the unitary transformation.
We see that the requirement that the dynamics is correctly mapped between the two
theories does not give any additional piece of the duality map, but simply follows from the
other two: since all the quantities were already dual. This seems to be a general fact in
dualities between quantum field theories, though we do not necessarily expect it to be the
case for any duality. Namely, in a quantum field theory model, once we require that all
states and physical quantities between the two theories map correctly, i.e. according to the
isomorphism (33), then all correlation functions of the model automatically map correctly
as well. But the correlation functions of a quantum field theory model exhaust all the
dynamical information about the model, so that knowing all the correlation functions we
can, in principle, reconstruct the dynamics.
Thus, an alternative way to formulate duality is in terms of the correlation functions.
This is, in fact, how duality is usually formulated in the string theory literature. However,
we find our own conception of duality more illuminating, because it allows us to map the
states and the operators individually and directly, without having to unscramble this
information from the full set of correlation functions. But either way, the main point is
that the dynamics is correctly equivariant with the duality map.
5.2.4 Interpretation
With our boson-fermion duality now in hand, we return to Section 3.2.3’s theme that a
duality should respect the interpretation maps introduced in Section 2.3. Our initial point
in Section 3.2.3 was that since duality relates two model triples, and interpretation maps
apply to model triples (strictly speaking: their components, such as the set of quantities),
interpretation simply proceeds independently on the two sides of the duality. The range of
these interpretation maps could be: either two distinct but isomorphic ‘sectors of reality’,
or the very same sector of reality—in which case there is a triangular rather than square
diagram, as in Figures 8 and 9. We also said that the choice between these cases was a
matter of an ‘internal’ vs. an ‘external’ interpretation.
External interpretations for the models are straightforward to read off from the model
triples: they are the bosonic, respectively fermionic, interpretations which the two models
come with in the first place (i.e. in this case, their original historical interpretations).
There is a natural map IInt which assigns intensions: for example, it maps a bare or
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abstract bosonic state to the meaning ‘boson on a line with such-and-such properties’.
And the map IExt assigns extensions. For example, it maps the abstract expectation
value of a bosonic field to a measurable property of a specific boson that is fixed as
the reference by the context of use. For example, the property might be the boson’s
amplitude or probability of being at a specific place at a specific time: we say ‘amplitude
or probability’, since we understand a value or expectation value, written schematically
as 〈Q, s〉, to also represent all the matrix elements 〈s1|Qˆ|s2〉 (cf. Section 3.2.1-(1)). In
the fermionic model, there are similar interpretation maps for the fermionic model triple:
where the codomains of the maps are now not the properties of bosons, but the properties
of (say) electrons! Thus clearly, on the external interpretation the codomains of the maps
do not need to agree. In philosophical jargon: the set of possible worlds where the bosons
and the fermions appear need not be the same sets of worlds.
The internal interpretation abstracts from the specific structure of the two models, so
that the two model triples receive the same interpretation. This interpretation is therefore
best worked out at the level of the theory. Since the duality is exact, each model contains
both bosonic and fermionic states, as we discussed in Section 5.2.2. This means that the
world (or set of worlds) which is the codomain of our interpretation, should contain both
bosons and fermions. The interpretation maps, applied to the models, must commute
with the duality map d (or, equivalently, U) in Eqs. (32)-(33). The interpretations will
map J(z) and T (z) to a current and a stress-energy tensor, respectively; (as intensions or
as extensions, as appropriate: in the ensuing discussion, we shall not make this distinc-
tion, since everything we say applies equally well to both kinds of maps). The internal
interpretation also maps the abstract expectation value of a bosonic field (whether written
as φ(z) or as a fermion bilinear) to the amplitude or probability of some bosonic event.
Likewise, the abstract expectation value (matrix element) of a fermionic field between two
suitable given states will be mapped to the transition amplitude between two fermionic
states.
5.3 Defining a theory from the two model triples
We now return to Section 2.4’s theme: of defining a theory by abstraction from its model
triples. We first discuss how our duality’s having just two isomorphic model triples makes
this enterprise vulnerable, in two ways (Section 5.3.1). Then we undertake to define a
theory, a common core, from the two models; and discuss their specific structures (Section
5.3.2). Thus the general issues of Section 5.3.1—which return us to the Hilbertian themes
at the start of Section 1—will lead in to the specific details of Section 5.3.2.
5.3.1 Two vulnerabilities
At first sight, there might seem to be no issues about the definition of a theory (in our
sense, from Sections 1.1 and 2.2.1) from a pair of model triples that are isomorphic: or
indeed, from any set of two or more isomorphic model triples. Can we not simply define
the theory as the structure of which the isomorphic model triples are isomorphic ‘concrete’
copies? More precisely: here we should clarify the phrase ‘as the structure of which’, in
order to respect Section 2.2.2’s point that a model (in our sense!) usually realizes a
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theory by being a representation of it, and representation allows mere homomorphism,
rather than isomorphism. So the thought is: can we not simply define the theory as the
structure, S say, of which the (two or more) isomorphic model triples are representations—
as it happens, isomorphic ones? Talk of S thus defined as a theory will then engender
admitting all its representations as models in Section 2.2.2’s sense.
We agree that this relaxed attitude is tenable. After all, ‘theory’ is a term of art: so
one is at liberty to define it as one sees fit. But in both pure mathematics and theoretical
physics, the abstraction (‘extraction’) of a general pattern or structure from a given set of
examples is a matter of judgement, to be made in the light of one’s aims and intuitions,
including the aim of representing the world as accurately as possible. This means that
there are two related worries one might have: that is, two limitations to which the above
strategy for defining a theory is vulnerable.
(i): Suppose that—as in our bosonization case-study—the given examples are iso-
morphic: where ‘isomorphic’ is itself a term of art, made precise by some mathematical
structure we see exactly copied in the examples. Then one worries that there might be
non-isomorphic examples which one has not thought of (has not ‘been given’) that are
equally good examples of the general pattern one is trying to write down—that equally
fit one’s aims and intuitions.
(ii): Suppose the given examples are not isomorphic; (again, in the sense we have in
mind, especially initially). Still one worries that they might not be sufficiently varied,
so that the pattern one writes down after considering them is too restrictive. That is:
the pattern encodes aspect(s) that, given one’s aims and intuitions, are really accidental
commonalities of the examples. Recall (from the end of Section 2.4) the example of colour
as an artefact that could beset Frege’s definition of direction as an equivalence class of
mutually parallel lines.
The general answer to these worries lies in the point, argued in Section 3.2.2, that
for models which purport to describe the physical world, the distinction between what is
in the triple and what is specific structure cannot be blurred.42 So these worries can be
set aside: for a give target system, typically only a single triple will provide a complete
description—up to isomorphism, that is.
So much by way of rehearsing the general issues about defining a theory from models:
specifically, from model triples. For the purposes of this paper, what matters is how these
issues play out in our case-study, bosonization. Section 5.3.2 will give details about this.
But to summarise:— The theory we will construct in Section 5.3.2 is the simplest one that
42As an example, consider the bosonic and fermionic models, but now weakened by the stipulation that
the Virasoro algebra belong to the model triple, while the affine Kac-Moody algebra (and the third line
in Eq. (25)) belongs to the specific structure. As we argued in Section 3.2.2, this stipulation changes the
physical content of the models, and so it is not innocuous. The models thus obtained contain different
numbers of (uninterpreted) physical degrees of freedom, and so cannot describe the bosons or the fermions
of Section 4. This is because the boson and the fermion CFTs (even before they are physically interpreted)
treat the Kac-Moody degrees of freedom not as ‘accidental commonalities’, in the sense of Section 2.4:
but as physical, and related to the Virasoro generators by the Sugawara construction. (For example, if
we drop the chiral symmetry on the fermionic model, we lose the reason to restrict to chiral quantities
only: cf. Section 5.2.2; and likewise for the boson’s affine current symmetry algebra.) Thus the boson
and fermion models are not dual, if based on just the Virasoro algebra. We thank Josh Hunt for bringing
up this example.
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can be constructed from our bosonic and fermionic model triples, using the isomorphism
at hand from Section 5.2. But in line with this Subsection’s comments, we make no
claim that is the only (or even best) way to ‘extract a pattern’ from the model triples.
Indeed, our final two Subsections, Sections 5.4 and 5.5, will consider other such ways: in
particular, by taking into account other models.
5.3.2 Defining the theory
In this subsection, we collect our results from Section 5.2 about the two model triples, in
order to define our theory. We have so far defined two models:—
(a) A bosonic model triple, b := 〈SB,QB,DB〉, with: SB = HB, the Hilbert space which
is constructed from the irreducible highest-weight representations of the enveloping alge-
bra of the affine Lie algebra, represented on the bosons. ‘Represented on the bosons’ here
means that the generators of the affine Lie algebra (25), which proceed from the Laurent
expansion (24), are constructed from the bosonic fields (18) and (19) (and their anti-
holomorphic counterparts). Thus, QB is the set of normally-ordered analytic functions
in the bosonic currents (J(z)B, J¯(z¯)B, T (z)B, T¯ (z¯)B); and DB = L0,B + L¯0,B the dilatation
operator of the bosonic model.
(b) A fermionic model triple, f := 〈SF,QF,DF〉, with: SF the same Hilbert space,
represented on the fermions, HF; QF the set of normally-ordered analytic functions of the
currents (J(z)F, J¯(z¯)F, T (z)F, T¯ (z¯)F); and DF = L0,F + L¯0,F the dilatation operator of the
fermionic model.
What structures make up the ‘specific structure’ M¯ , of each of the models B := 〈b, B¯〉
and F := 〈f, F¯ 〉, in the sense of our notation in Section 2.2.3, and especially Eq. (2)? On
the bosonic side, the specific structure B¯ clearly contains the field φ(z) (and functionals
of it), together with the symmetry algebra (17) acting on it. This symmetry algebra will,
however, manifest itself in the model triple through the affine currents and their algebra.
Also the defining relations of the field (equation of motion, etc.) are specific to B¯.
On the fermionic side, it is the field ψ(z), with its chirality symmetry (and a different
set of defining relations, equation of motion, etc.), which are parts of the specific struc-
ture F¯ . Though ψ(z) defines a state in the Hilbert space, as discussed in Section 5.2.2,
thinking of this state as created by ψ(z), i.e. a fermion with certain meromorphic and
chirality properties, it is part of the specific structure. All the Hilbert space knows about
this fermion is that there is a state of conformal weight (1
2
, 0).
We are now ready to discuss the theory which we can construct from these two mod-
els: by discussing the common core of the two models, i.e. the model triples (or roots),
to which the theory is isomorphic: b ∼= f ∼= T . It is a theory based on four currents
(J(z), J¯(z¯), T (z), T¯ (z¯)) of conformal dimensions (1, 0), (0, 1), (2, 0), (0, 2), satisfying the
enveloping algebra with c = 1 and k = 1. Its states are the unitary representations of this
algebra. The dynamics is given by singling out the Hamiltonian H = L0 + L¯0.
Sets of symmetries of the theory: The theory has two built-in sets of symmetries: (i)
a conformal group and (what we shall call), generated by the stress-energy tensor, (ii) an
affine current symmetry algebra, generated by the J-currents.
60
(i) The conformal symmetry group, Eq. (16), is represented in the same way in the
two models—since this is a symmetry group of the background spacetime. This is also
related to the fact that the Hamiltonian, and hence the dilations, are related by equiv-
ariance between the two theories. Again: T (z), the stress-energy tensor of the theory, is
represented in both the models.
(ii) The affine current symmetry algebra is represented very differently in the two
models! Namely, as affine current algebra transformations (Eq. (17) in Section 4.1(ii))
on the bosonic model, but as left- and right-chiral symmetry algebra (Eq. (28) in Section
4.2(ii)) on the fermionic model. This symmetry algebra restricts the kinds of physical
quantities in the theory, as we have explicitly discussed in Section 5.2.2, in the same way.
Yet the theory does not “see” any of the features from which the affine current algebra
arises: which are very different in the two models, viz. the transformations of the fields
Eq. (17) vs. (28).
We have discussed this duality in some detail because it is a good model to the more
general, and technically involved, boson-fermion dualities in two-dimensional conformal
field theory: to which we turn in Section 5.5.
5.4 Further abstraction
The discussion in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.3 illustrates our theme of the limitations of abstrac-
tion. We constructed our theory from two isomorphic model triples: the model triple of
the theory was built from the representations of the enveloping algebra of the affine Lie
algebra (25), which give a unique set of states (discussed in Section 5.2.1), and a basic
set of quantities: the generators of the algebra themselves. The dynamics was a choice
of a Hamiltonian among the quantities (Section 5.2.3). As we saw in Section 5.2.2, the
full set of quantities Q of the theory contains more than just the basic set: so that ar-
bitrary analytic functionals of the currents (J(z), J¯(z¯), T (z), T¯ (z¯)), and their derivatives,
are allowed. Compare the discussion of the symmetry algebra (ii) in Section 5.3.
But we also know, from Sections 2.4 and 5.3.1, that there are no general rules, fixed
once-and-for-all, for defining theories. So one asks: to what extent is our procedure above
unique? It is of course unique if what one wishes to describe is a boson or a fermion, as
given systems with known degrees of freedom. But the procedure of abstraction suggests
three natural ways in which our theory might be modified. The first way would make
for a more restrictive theory; the other two entail further abstraction, thus allowing for a
more general one.
(a) The conformal symmetry group (Section 5.3.2-(i)) was used to form the enveloping
algebra. Hence it is realised by the states and the quantities, in the sense that the states
and quantities form representations of this symmetry group. But one can construct a
new theory in which the class of operators is reduced: namely, by placing restrictions on
the conformal transformation properties of the quantities. This leads to a theory with a
smaller set of quantities (and subsequently to bosonic and fermionic models with smaller
sets of quantities). Alternatively, one can reduce the space of states by placing similar
restrictions on them.
(b) The affine current symmetry algebra (Section 5.3.2-(ii)) limited the set of quantities
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to those that can be constructed from the currents (J(z), J¯(z¯), T (z), T¯ (z¯)) (as mentioned
at the start of this subsection). But one might decide that this is not a symmetry algebra
one wishes to keep, for the physical system of interest; (for example, in the presence of mass
terms, this symmetry algbera will be dropped). One then allows a larger class of, or even
all, self-adjoint, renormalisable operators constructed from (31), not just the ones that
preserve this symmetry algebra. In this way, one clearly gets a richer theory (with a larger
set of operators and states), of which Section 4’s two models are still representations.43
And as we stressed in Section 3.2.2, it is a matter of physical judgment, which kinds of
operators one needs to admit in order to describe the physics at hand. In particular: if one
wants to add a mass, one is forced to generalise the theory in this way. The boson-fermion
duality continues to hold, thanks to the existence of the maps Eq. (31) and (34). But we
get a more general class of theories, which will not necessarily be each other’s duals: the
generality of the class depends on which additional set of operators one takes on board
with the quantities. This will be illustrated explicitly in Section 5.5.
(c) Though the two models share the spacetime coordinates z, z¯, these coordinates do
not enter the basic considerations that led to building the states, quantities, and dynamics
of the theory, in Sections 5.2.1-5.2.3. Indeed, the basic object of interest, in constructing
the triple, is the algebra of the mode operators Ln and Jn (and powers of them): and
these are spacetime-independent. Furthermore, these modes contain essentially the same
information as the spacetime-dependent currents (J(z), J¯(z¯), T (z), T¯ (z¯)), i.e. the latter
can be reconstructed from the former through the Laurent expansions (24), which take
identical form in the fermionic case. So, one might decide that z, z¯ are just book-keeping
devices with no essential information about the theory. On this view, one can construct a
theory just based on the algebra (25) and its representations, without its spatio-temporal
realization. The bosonic and fermionic model triples then still form (spatio-temporal)
representations of this algebra: but one can envisage the existence of other represen-
tations, which are not spatio-temporally realised. This would presumably give rise to
non-isomorphic models, in the sense of Sections 2.4 and 5.3.1. While doing away with
spacetime may seem a radical suggestion, it is not so uncommon: think e.g. of spin chains
as possible models.
Point (a) is a straightforward modification of our theory, but also of the models. So it
should not be seen as illustrating the limitations of abstraction, in the sense of Sections
2.4 and 5.3.1. Rather, it is a method to obtain more restrictive theories, by consistently
strengthening the symmetry requirements of the models.
But points (b) and (c) do illustrate our remarks, in Sections 2.4 and 5.3.1, about the
need for models to be ‘sufficiently varied’. By taking, in (b) and (c), some of the symmetry
shared by the models to be accidental, one gets a larger class of models, which is likely
to include non-isomorphic ones.
In the next subsection, we will give such examples of dualities between isomorphic
models which are more general: either because they have less symmetry, or because they
have more fields, with additional symmetries.
43Notice that the ambiguity here is in the best definition of the theory, not of the duality: cf. footnote
42.
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5.5 General boson-fermion dualities
In this Subsection, we briefly discuss two generalizations of our basic duality. The two
generalizations are important for our discussion since they fulfill, even better than our
basic duality does, Section 1.2’s two desiderata for the choice of examples of dualities.
Recall that these desiderata were: on the one hand, (i) an example should be mathemat-
ically precise and represent established physics; and on the other hand, (ii) an example
should be scientifically important (as described more fully in Section 2.1).
As we will see, these desiderata will be amply fulfilled by this Subsection’s two gener-
alizations. The first generalization especially illustrates scientific importance. The second
illustrates, not so much mathematical precision per se: but rather, mathematical richness
and generality, thus showing that the boson-fermion duality described in this Section is
not an isolated ‘coincidence’ that holds for free, massless models, but part of a very rich
class of mathematically interesting (as well as rigorous!) isomorphic models. Thus we will
here define a rich class of theories, each of which is an equivalence class of exactly two
isomorphic model triples.
We will discuss the two kinds of generalization in turn, in the next two subsections.
Section 5.5.1 discusses the duality between the massive Thirring model and the sine-
Gordon model. Section 5.5.2 considers non-abelian versions of boson-fermion duality. In
both cases, we must be brief and must suppress technical details.
5.5.1 Duality between the Thirring model and the sine-Gordon model
The basic boson-fermion duality can be extended to include mass terms for the fermions,
and interaction terms for both fermions and bosons. This generalisation is important,
because it shows that the duality is not a special property that only occurs in the free,
massless case, in which the action is conformally invariant. Massive, and interactive,
theories are also subject to duality. So this strengthens the scientific importance of duality:
it brings duality into the ‘real world’. In fact, the Thirring model-sine-Gordon duality is
quite important in condensed matter systems. See Giamarchi (2003), Altland and Simons
(2010).
The massless Thirring model generalises the free, massless Dirac fermion by the addi-
tion of a quartic interaction term for the fermions, with coupling constant g. This quartic
interaction is built from the J-currents, and so preserves the chiral symmetry algebra
described in (ii), Section 4.2. The model can be solved exactly, and the quantum theory
is well-defined only for g > −pi (Coleman (1975: p. 2094)).44
The fermionic mass term in the massive Thirring model explicitly breaks the chiral
symmetry algebra described in (ii), Section 4.2. This is because the mass term which is
added to the action of the Dirac fermion, Eq. (26), mixes the left- and right-chiral (Weyl)
fermions. It takes the following form:
∆Smass = m
(
ψ˜† ψ + ψ† ψ˜
)
. (37)
44Looking at the relation between the couplings (1) (Section 1.2), this will correspond to the value
β2 <∞ of the bosonic coupling.
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Remember that the action (26) did not mix the left-chiral Weyl fermion ψ, ψ† with the
right-chiral Weyl fermion ψ˜, ψ˜†. The above mass term explicitly mixes the two, and so
breaks the chiral symmetry algebra.
The mass term (37) can be translated into a bosonic term using a straightforward
generalisation of the dictionary (31). The generalisation is straightforward in that it
takes the same form, but now depends on a bosonic coupling β, which is related to the




: sin(βφ) := 0 , (38)
and so the fermionic coupling is related, through (1), to the bosonic coupling β. Notice
that, to linear order in β, the above reduces to a standard bosonic mass term, with mass
µ. We are here, however, interested in the exact model.





: cos βφ : , (39)
where µ is a scale which originates in the normal ordering procedure, and appears in the
boson-fermion dictionary as an overall multiplicative constant.45
The algebra underlying the model triple of this model is still the enveloping algebra






. We see that in the limit of zero fermionic coupling, we reproduce the algebra at
level 1.
Our discussion, in Section 5.2, of the isomorphic model triples, thus generalises to
the massive Thirring and sine-Gordon models, with appropriate modifications. In both
cases, the algebra is the enveloping algebra, now with a coupling-dependent level. There-
fore, the discussion of the states is analogous to the one in Section 5.2.1: the Hilbert
space consists of the highest-weight representations of the enveloping algebra, and their
descendants. The quantities are constructed from a wider class of operators, compared to
our discussion in Section 5.2.2. Namely, the quantities now include non-chiral operators
(respectively, operators which break affine current algebra transformations: see Section
4.1-(ii) for bosons, Section 4.2 for fermions) built from the fields: such as (38) for the
bosons, and (37) for the fermions. Finally, the dynamics is still given by the Hamiltonian,
which is the zero component of the Virasoro generator L0, in the bosonic or fermionic
representation. Thus, we get a theory by abstraction from these two isomorphic triples,
as outlined in Section 5.3.
As we remarked before, this generalised theory explicitly illustrates our comment (b)
in Section 5.4, about the contingent nature of the chiral symmetry algebra. By allowing
the theory to break the chiral symmetry algebra, we get a wider class of theories (which
depend on the coupling and the mass): a class of which the basic free, massless case is
just a special case.
45The scale µ is already present in the massless theory. But it does not play any important role, since
it is just an overall renormalisation constant.
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5.5.2 Non-abelian boson-fermion dualities
As we mentioned in this Subsection’s preamble, the free, massless bosons and fermions
can be generalised in another direction (Witten (1984)): to include non-abelian degrees
of freedom. We will not here provide any technical details, but we will simply list some of
the important examples of dualities studied in the literature; all of which are conformal
field theories, except for (c) and (e):
(a) N free Majorana (real) fermions, in an N -dimensional vector representation of
O(N). They are dual to the bosonic, Wess-Zumino-Witten (WZW) model with an O(N)
symmetry group. The Wess-Zumino-Witten model is a model whose action is built from a
bosonic group element (rather than an algebra element), in this case an N ×N matrix of
O(N). The bosonic and fermionic models are both invariant under the affine Lie algebra
transformations of OL(N)×OR(N) (for left- and right-action, respectively) at level k = 1.
In both cases, the central charge is c = N/2.
(b) N free, massless Dirac (complex) fermions are dual to a bosonic WZW model with
group U(N). The two models satisfy the affine Lie algebra of SUL(N)× SUR(N)×U(1),
with central charge c = N and k = 1.
(c) Mass terms can be added to the Dirac fermions in case (b), with modifications in
the dictionary and in the bosonic theory which are similar to the ones discussed in the
previous subsection.
(d) The Majorana and Dirac fermion models can be endowed with colour and flavour
charges. Majorana fermions with NF flavours and NC colours, thus transforming under
the group [O(NF) × O(NC)]L × [O(NF) × O(NC)]R, are dual to the Wess-Zumino-Witten
action with two bosonic fields, taking values in O(NF) and O(NC). In the same way,
NF×NC Dirac fermions can be expressed as the sum of two Wess-Zumino-Witten actions,
and a third term for an aadditional field. The three bosonic fields take values in the
group manifolds SU(NF), SU(NC), and U(1). Again, one finds two copies of the affine Lie
algebra, now with levels different from one, viz. k = NF and k = NF, respectively. This
duality can also be generalised to other gauge groups.
(e) Mass terms can be added to the theories (d) with flavour and colour charges, with
appropriate modifications in the dictionary and in the bosonic theory, as before.
All of the above models end up having model triple structures which are constructed
as representations of the enveloping algebra of the affine Lie algebra (41) in the Appendix,
for various values of the level, k, and the central charge c, and for different Lie groups.
Thus their Hilbert spaces are constructed from the highest-weight representations, which
as we already saw in Section 5.2.1 are unique up to unitary transformations. Clearly,
all of these theories can be given a set of states, as discussed in Section 5.2.1, of which
the bosonic and fermionic models form two representations. Also, all of these theories
are based on the same class of algebras, with generators Jn and Ln as in (25) for the
bosonic case, and likewise for the fermionic case in Section 4.2 and their anti-holomorphic
counterparts (see Eq. (41) in the Appendix). Thus, each of these theories can also be
given a set of quantities, in the way discussed in Section 5.2.2. For the non-chiral theories
(c) and (e), this set of quantities is enlarged by the addition of non-chiral quantities, as
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we already discussed in detail in the abelian case in Section 5.5.1. Finally, the dynamics
of these models is as discussed in Section 5.2.3.
In conclusion, this large class of examples, based on a general enveloping algebra of
an affine Lie algebra, exemplifies our schema for duality in Sections 2 and 3, just as the
basic case did in Section 5.2. Namely: a duality is an isomorphism between models. More
specifically: it is an isomorphism between model triples; since models also have their own
specific structures. And the theory obtained for each of the dualities accords with what
we said in Section 2.4: equivalence classes of isomorphic model triples give rise to a theory
which is itself a triple, in which the models’ specific structures have been abstracted away.
And finally: our comments about non-isomorphic models (in Sections 2.4, 5.3.1, and 5.4)
are illustrated by the examples (c)-(e). For these models have less symmetry: the theory
which then results is more general.
Envoi
In the physics and philosophy of physics literature, a duality in physics is agreed to be a
matter of two theories being in some sense ‘the same’. In this paper, we have answered
the question how this can be made precise, and illustrated our answer with a case-study:
bosonization.
We have proposed that a duality is best understood formally, i.e. in terms of uninter-
preted theories: hence our term, ‘schema’. Namely: there is a bare theory—the common
core of the two given theories—which has various models, among which are the two given
theories. The duality then consists in the fact that these two models are isomorphic as
regards the structure and notions given in the bare theory. (Thus each of the two models
also has specific structure of its own, which is unmatched by the other; and the bare
theory also has, in general, other non-isomorphic models.) Often, this isomorphism is a
surprising fact, since the two given theories are presented in very different terms.
We spelt out this schema in detail, in Sections 2 to 3. Among the themes we empha-
sized are: (i) the distinction between theories and models, (ii) the role of interpretation,
(iii) the relations between a duality and the symmetries of the two given theories, and
(iv) the presence of non-isomorphic models in physics.
Then in Sections 4 and 5, we illustrated the schema with bosonization. This is a mat-
ter of a quantum field theory of bosons being in some sense ‘the same’ as a quantum field
theory of fermions. Nowadays, many such boson-fermion pairings are known. Our discus-
sion emphasized the simplest, and earliest, case, which is known to hold exactly: a duality
between a free, massless bosonic quantum field theory, and a free, massless fermionic the-
ory, both in two spacetime dimensions. But we ended with a brief overview of other
examples: involving, in particular, interacting and massive theories. (And there are ex-
tensions to higher dimensions: see e.g. Kopietz (2008); as well as an experimental interest
in these systems as realising e.g. one-dimensional spin chains: Giamarchi (2003: Chapter
2), Altland and Simons (2010: Sections 4.3 and 9.4.4).)
Our schema, and this illustration of it, of course leaves plenty of work still to be done.
As to physics, one should seek other illustrations of the schema: maybe some of these
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will prompt revision, or at least augmentation, of the schema. As to philosophy, one
should ask what light this schema casts on philosophical debates about the interpretation
of physical theories, and about such theories’ equivalence. But we postpone these topics
to another occasion.
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Appendix. Some Elements of Conformal Field Theory
In Section 4.1, we used the notion of a primary field. A primary field of conformal weight









Φ(f(z), f¯(z¯)) . (40)
This is in analogy with the transformation law for covariant tensors in ordinary QFTs: it
takes the transformation property of the field under conformal transformations as defining
for the class of primary fields. The physical significance of primary fields is discussed
around Eq. (20).
In our analysis in Sections 4 abd 5, an essential role was played by the enveloping
Virasoro algebra (25), with c = 1 and k = 1. This algebra is a special case of the
following general enveloping algebra of an affine Lie algebra:
[Ln, Lm] = (n−m)Ln+m + c
12










n+m + k n δab δn+m . (41)
Here, c is the central charge and k is the level, and fabc are the structure constants of the
underlying Lie algebra of the affine Lie algebra. Notice that the above algebra contains,
in the first line, the ordinary Virasoro algebra. And the last line is the affine Lie algebra.
The middle line gives the commutation relation between generators of the two algebras.46
46For more on affine Lie algebras, see Di Francesco et al. (1997: Chapter 14) or Kac (1990).
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